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ABSTRACT 
The Effects of an Employment Tax Enforcement Regime on US Small Business and 
Proprietor Payment Compliance 
by 
Rafael Dacal 
April 2017 
Chair: Dr. Detmar W. Straub, Jr 
Major Academic Unit: J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
This study attempted to identify ways to improve voluntary compliance and 
minimize taxpayer burden, but also tries to understand the behavior of taxpayers’ 
compliance given the compliance regimen. Most explicitly, it attempted to identify ways 
to improve payment compliance using regimens already utilized in other parts of the tax 
code.  The research question was whether different tax regimes, such as safe harbor, can 
change the behavior of employment tax payment for small business or self-employed 
taxpayers.  The idea was to determine if a safe harbor provision can reduce the proclivity 
of authorized individuals to implement a payroll tax dilemma strategy and whether or 
regimen can reduce payment noncompliance in time of economic distress.  To answer the 
research question, an online experiment was employed.  The experimental design was an 
impact study.  The population of interest in this study was all authorized individuals from 
small and self-employed firms.  The sample size totaled 205, and it was based on the a-
priori sample size calculation.   Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was chosen as the data 
analysis technique, but other nonparametric test and logistic regression models were used 
to further analyze the data.  This study showed that for subjects who did not subscribed to 
 xiv 
safe harbor provision but experienced an increased probability of apprehension increased 
their payment compliance.  Also, the availability of a safe harbor provision lead to a large 
numbers to a safe harbor provision subscription in order to avoid enforcement.  This 
study was able to show that individuals were willing to improve their payment 
compliance rate when enforcement was increased.  The General Deterrence Theory 
explains that increased deterrence will lead to higher compliance.  The study showed a 10 
percent improvement in payment compliance when safe harbor was implemented.  The 
results from this study also suggest that provisions such as a safe harbor can be a method 
of reducing filing costs and audit costs and ultimately taxpayer burden.  On the other 
hand, the results of this study were inconclusive in determining if such provisions can 
improve payment compliance.  Nevertheless, the outcome of this study can improve 
timing and accuracy of employment taxes payments and it may improve the accuracy of 
employment tax payment. 
 
 
INDEX WORDS: Employment tax, compliance, payment compliance, employment tax 
enforcement regime, Small Business, experimental design, ANOVA, 
nonparametric test, General Deterrence Theory, audit, tax enforcement, risk 
attitude scale, online experiment 
 
 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Taxes are as old as humanity and so is tax noncompliance.  Therefore, even 
though the concept of noncompliance is ancient, the in-depth study of tax compliance 
only began around the late 1960s.  One definition of tax compliance was articulated in 
Gregory v. Helvering 293 U.S. 465 (1935) decision, which states that as long as 
information is complete, timely, and accurate under the tax code, no taxpayer is bound 
under any sense of “patriotic duty” (69 F.2d 811) to pay more than their fair share.  
Conversely, the act of not filing taxes with information that is complete, timely, and 
accurate is noncompliance, whether the act is deliberate or accidental. 
On a positive note, the vast majority of taxpayers comply properly with their 
complete tax obligation, but noncompliance remains the major reason for the existence of 
the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  In general, the IRS enforces compliance via the 
National Research Program (NRP).  This program randomly selects a stratified sample of 
approximately 50,000 to intensively audit.  Using this audit information, IRS develops 
internal algorithms for case scoring and workload case selection and for calculating the 
tax gap.  However, the number of audits over the last several years has been decreasing 
mainly due to budgetary constraints and employee attrition. In an optimal environment, 
random selection would be used in all audit cases to maximize compliance (Bloomquist, 
2009).  However due to the aforementioned constraints, the Service is trying to find ways 
to improve voluntary payment, filling, and reporting compliance, including variants on 
employment tax. 
Taxpayer compliance can be sub categorized into three types: payment, filling, 
and reporting compliance (Brown & Mazur, 2003).  Payment compliance is the accurate 
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payment of tax liabilities.  Filing compliance is the complete, timely, and accurate filing 
of tax forms.  Reporting compliance is the correct reporting of tax amounts owed to the 
US government.  Of the three sub categories, this study focused on the first type, payment 
compliance of employment tax.  While there have been numerous experimental studies 
on compliance, none has focused on employment tax.  This is important because one of 
the major focuses for the Service has been to improve voluntary compliance of 
employment tax, which accounts for about 72 billion dollars of the tax gap, which is any 
misreporting and eventual underpayment of tax liability.  Currently, the tax gap 
associated with employment tax is equivalent to the budgets of the Energy Department, 
the Department of Homeland Security, and the Commerce Department combined. 
In addition to the financial importance of understanding this tax base, this study 
focused on payment compliance because most of the employment tax noncompliance 
arises from payment noncompliance.  This phenomenon occurs because employment tax 
has a very high level of information matching, so it is relatively easy to detect filing and 
reporting noncompliance.  This is a primary motivation for the current study in that 
results here could be used to improve voluntary compliance efforts and reduce taxpayer 
burden.  In addition, efforts that advance our understanding of compliance in this 
circumstance could reduce the 72 billion dollar US tax gap. 
Employment tax and income tax withheld from employees’ pay is reported using 
Form 941 “Employer’s QUARTERLY Federal Tax Return” or one of the forms in the 
94x series.  To assist employers in completing and complying with the necessary forms, 
the IRS publishes Publication 15 (Circular E).  This publication provides the guideline 
employers should follow when filing and depositing employment tax. 
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One of the requirements is to file employment tax at a regular interval, depending 
on different tax liability thresholds.  In most cases, firms are required to deposit their tax 
liability on a bi-weekly or monthly basis to avoid incurring penalties and falling behind 
on payments.  However, there are times when companies facing economic distress will 
use employment tax withholding to overcome liquidity shortcomings (Grady, 2013).  
This business decision is defined as the “payroll tax dilemma” (pg.1) and the legal 
liability is associated with an authorized individual.  An authorized individual is someone 
who is personally liable for the payment of employment tax withholdings deposits. 
The payroll tax dilemma is when a firm cannot meet its operational liabilities and 
illegally uses employment tax withholdings to pay against the firm’s liabilities (Godfrey, 
2004; Mauldin & Wilder, 1997).  The problem that arises from the payroll tax dilemma 
strategy is that many of these businesses continue to illegally borrow from withheld taxes 
for lengthening periods of time and Grady (2013) found this strategy will inevitably lead 
to firm failure. 
The present study first assumes that authorized individuals will succumb to the 
payroll tax dilemma during business crises.  We define business crises as an income 
shock, which reduces firms’ revenues.  The argument is that individuals decide to use 
employment tax withholding as a short-term loan without clearly understanding the 
negative implications.  Some of the implications could be increased interest and penalties 
and personal financial responsibilities on amounts due.  To examine downstream effects, 
we introduced a safe harbor
1
 provision to determine if an intervention minimized the 
incidence of the payroll tax dilemma. 
                                                 
1
 A safe harbor provision specifies conditions that protect individuals or firms from being deemed in 
violation of the Internal Revenue Code and subject to an IRS audit 
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Lastly, this study sets out to enhance the body of knowledge on employment tax 
payment compliance by studying the employment tax payment behavior exhibited by 
sole-proprietors and small business owners.  Although the literature on tax compliance is 
extensive, the literature has not taken a great interest in the issue of employment tax 
compliance and even less on the issue of employment tax payment compliance.  It is not 
clear from the literature as to why this topic has not been addressed given its large 
economic implications, but unavailability of data and lack of record matching have been 
some of the possible reasons. With that said, there have been some changes to the tax 
code and advances in the technology, both of which may allow for additional studies of 
this particular segment of the tax base. 
Nevertheless, the dearth of studies is puzzling given there is a consensus in the 
literature that small business and sole proprietors are more likely to be noncompliant than 
other filing groups (Rasholnikov, 2006).  The current study allowed subjects to misreport, 
but it also instituted an audit regimen and imposed a penalty.  By testing the changes in 
behavior of authorized individuals given the requisite reporting compliance regimen, we 
attempted to identify ways to improve voluntary compliance and minimize taxpayer 
burden, but also to better understand the behavior of employment tax payment 
compliance. 
The dissertation was divided in six sections.  Section 2 provides the practical 
motivation that drove this research study.  Section 3 lists the central research question 
that this study set out to answer.  Section 4 reviews the current body of knowledge, 
starting from the broad scope of taxes to a narrower scope of employment taxes and tax 
compliance.  Section 5 provides the theoretical motivation and theoretical model used to 
 5 
test the research question.  Section 6 provides a synopsis to the literature review.  Section 
7 list hypotheses in this study.  Section 8 details the methods used to achieve the research 
objective.  The section will include experimental design and statistical tests.  Section 9 
provides the finding obtained by the experiment.  Section 10 provides discussion and 
conclusion identified from the findings section.  Section 11 list the limitations associated 
with the design and potential future research that could improve the body of knowledge 
relevant to employment tax payment compliance.  All relevant forms and additional 
information are included in Appendices. 
 
  
 6 
II PRACTICAL MOTIVATION 
The practical motivation for this study was to improve our understanding of 
reporting and voluntary compliance of employment tax payment.  It is possible that from 
this research study the Internal Revenue Service will modify certain employment tax 
reporting and payment processes.  These changes could lead to a lower taxpayer burden, 
such as a reduction in filing costs and audit costs, thus enhancing and adhering to the 
Taxpayer Bill of Rights.  On the other hand, this project should also provide the IRS with 
improvements to its tax compliance and tax collection process and policies.  Therefore, 
the proposed outcome could improve timing and accuracy of employment tax payment, 
and could improve the accuracy of employment tax Federal Tax Deposits. 
II.1 Employment Tax Motivation 
The current tax code allows business owners to deduct legitimate expenses from 
the owners’ tax income.  This process is normally done using Form 1040 Schedule C – 
Profit or loss from small business (or sole proprietorship) or Form 1120 - U.S. 
Corporation Income Tax Return.
2
  However, these legitimate expenses do not preclude 
business or nonprofit entities from having employment tax liabilities.  The general 
misstatement of expenses by business owners may lead to underreporting and 
underpayment of all tax liabilities.  These actions costs the US government and, 
ultimately the citizenry, billions of dollars and it is termed the tax gap
3
 (IRS, 2012b), and 
it unfairly impacts those who voluntarily pay their fair share of taxes.  Of the estimated 
tax gap of $450 billion dollars, $122 billion are from Business income, $67 billion are 
from corporate income taxes and $72 billion are from employment taxes (IRS, 2012b).  
                                                 
2
 Examples of expenses that could be deducted are advertising, car expenses, and depletion. 
3
 The tax gap is the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid. 
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The tax gap is a good indicator of tax non-compliance (Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 
1998) and it accounts for approximately 15 to 17 percent of noncompliance (Mazar & 
Ariely, 2006; Winchester, 2009), but a larger percent of the tax gap is a direct result of 
non-filing and underreporting (Blumenthal, Christian, & Slemrod, 1998).  Given the cost 
associated with enforcement, the IRS believes that improving voluntary compliance is 
necessary to reduce the tax gap (IRS, 2009). 
In addition, the IRS is responsible for ensuring that taxpayers understand and 
meet their tax obligations.  Among those obligations is the filing and payment of 
employment tax.  Employment tax is the levies incurred by both an employer and 
employee when the employee is paid for services rendered.  These levies, or tax 
liabilities, include social security, Medicare, Federal Unemployment (FUTA) and 
individual income tax.  For all the aforementioned taxes, the two parties are not always 
responsible to pay or to match the amount owed.  For example, the Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC or the code) requires employers to match the social security and Medicare 
taxes the employee pays after earning income.  On the other hand, the code only requires 
employers to pay for FUTA, but it is not a requirement for employees.  This filing 
process requires sole-proprietors, partnerships, and corporations to file and deposit 
employment tax every time an employee works and incurs taxes beyond a certain tax 
liability threshold. 
Lastly, the IRS obtains employment tax filing and reporting information from 
employees (through W-2 or W-3 filing) and employers (through Form Series 94X 
filling).  This set of information is used to assess the accuracy of employment tax 
reporting.  To do so, the IRS matches the information on the W-2 forms against the 
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information reported on the 94X forms.  Then, the IRS can identify cases were 
discrepancies exist (i.e., W-2 amount ≠ Form 94X amount). For those cases with 
discrepancies, the accuracy of the employment tax filing by the firms are suspect and 
could lead to some form of an audit (field or correspondence).   
Table 1: Employment Taxes Civil Penalties Assessed, Fiscal Year 2014 
Employment taxes: Penalties assessed (in $1000) 
Civil penalties, total 6,946,702 
Accuracy 2,593        
Bad check 480,174        
Delinquency 1,429,205        
Estimated tax 6,155        
Failure to pay 3,495,287        
Federal tax deposits 1,532,364        
Fraud 455        
Other 469        
Source SOI Tax Stats - IRS Data Book
4
 
As the data in Table 1 suggests, reporting for employment tax by businesses is 
relatively accurate and one of the contributing factors is the matching of information to 
determine inaccuracies and the corresponding high-level audits.  The Table 1 also shows 
that accuracy only accounts for a negligible percent of cases where penalties were 
assessed.
5
  On the other hand, failure-to-pay accounts for 50.3 percent of penalties 
assessed.  This is why this study focused on payment compliance of employment tax and 
not filing compliance. 
II.2 Compliance Motivation 
According to Bloomquist (2009) the best way to accurately determine taxpayer 
compliance would be to use random audits.  Although small corporation audit coverage 
has increased over the last decade, there has been a substantial drop over the past two 
                                                 
4
 This table is an extract from “Table 17.  Civil Penalties Assessed and Abated, by Type of Tax and Type of 
Penalty, Fiscal Year 2014” obtained on 06/20/2015 at http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Civil-
Penalties-Assessed-and-Abated-by-Type-of-Tax-and-Type-of-Penalty-IRS-Tax-Stats-Table-17 
5
 For penalties to be assessed an audit must be conducted and changes to the filing information were made 
by revenue agent. 
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years (IRS, 2014a).  Given the current IRS noncompliance identification methods, 
shrinking enforcement personnel budgets, and the cost of random audits, the IRS is trying 
to find ways to improve employers’ voluntary payment, filing, and reporting compliance 
for employment tax. 
On the other hand, TIGTA (2011, 2014a, 2014b) found that there are issues with 
the NRP employment tax database making it harder for the Service to identify 
compliance issues with filing and payment.  This shortcoming makes it more difficult for 
the Service to identify compliance issues.  Nevertheless, the current system is believed to 
be the most reliable method currently available (Andreoni et al., 1998).  Furthermore, the 
IRS is currently using record matching criteria to identify potential field audit
6
.  While a 
small percent of employer go through a filed audit, close to 100 percent of the 
employment tax filings go through an automated (computer base) audit.  These audits 
could be characterized as computerize verification or automated audits, and taxpayers are 
seldom contacted or may only receive an IRS letter or notice.  For this research, the focus 
was not on the automated process, but on the most labor-intensive audits that require a 
revenue agent to conduct a physical audit.  The reasoning for this narrower focus was that 
physical audits are costly and IRS budgets are shrinking. 
As the These initiatives included revising the collection due process for 
employment taxes and studying employment tax reporting and filing compliance (IRS, 
2009) which included topics such as the Federal Tax Deposit (FTD) Alerts and using 
NRP to improve the employment tax compliance characteristics.  This study built on the 
                                                 
6
 IRS.gov defines a filed audit as an interview that may take place “at the taxpayer's home, place of 
business, or accountant's office” 
 10 
simplification of employment tax payment, which Bloomquist (2003b) states it could lead 
to increased compliance. 
 
Figure 1 shows, the US government has been incurring deficits since the 1970s.  
Over most of that time, deficits did not account for a sizable percentage of GDP and 
during the late 90s surpluses were incurred.  As a result of these long running deficits, the 
IRS began calculating and identifying ways to reduce the tax gap (Brown & Mazur, 
2003; Holland, 1958; IRS, 1996).  As a result of the ‘great recession’ and the raise of the 
US deficits to 9.7 percent of GDP (St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, 2014), the IRS 
instituted initiatives to curtail the $72 billion Tax gap from employment tax (IRS, 2009). 
These initiatives included revising the collection due process for employment 
taxes and studying employment tax reporting and filing compliance (IRS, 2009) which 
included topics such as the Federal Tax Deposit (FTD) Alerts and using NRP to improve 
the employment tax compliance characteristics.  This study built on the simplification of 
employment tax payment, which Bloomquist (2003b) states it could lead to increased 
compliance. 
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Figure 1: United States Federal Surplus or Deficits from September 1977 to 
September 2013 
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III RESEARCH QUESTION  
The research question is whether different tax regimes, such as safe harbor, can 
change the behavior of employment tax payment for small business or self-employed 
taxpayers.  The research is important in order to better appreciate the incentives that 
government agencies worldwide might be able to use to encourage voluntary tax 
compliance. 
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IV   LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section covers the key literature of employment (or trust) tax, reporting 
compliance and payment compliance.  The literature streams associated with this study 
are extensive.  The following highlight will provide information on the current state of 
knowledge and how the current research could increase the body of knowledge.  The 
figure below depicts the study literature space and how employment tax, payment 
compliance, and reporting compliance overlap.  Next, a general review on the tax 
literature will be provided.  That will followed by an extensive literature review on 
employment tax, reporting compliance, and payment compliance. 
 
Figure 2: Literature Review Space 
 
IV.1 Tax 
Taxation is as old as human society, and corvée was one of its earliest forms.  The 
concept of corvée required individuals in antiquities to provide labor in lieu of taxes.  
One of the first references of tax payment comes from the Bible – specifically Exodus7 – 
in the form of a poll tax.  As one can imagine, the tax literature is extensive, with 
academic journal articles going as far back as 1815 (Jay, 1815).   Needless to say, the 
                                                 
7
 The amount was half a shekel for every grown man as stated in Exodus 30:11-16 from 
https://www.bible.com/bible/1/exo.30. 
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depth of this literature could be attributed to the direct impact that taxation has on aspects 
of everyday life.  Some of these aspects are corporate strategy, personal income tax, and 
employment tax.  Since this study is positioned within the tax literature, a general review 
of the tax literature provides some current issues discussed in the literature and how they 
may relate to the present scope of study. 
Given the broad scope of the tax literature, our attention will be focused on issues 
in corporate and income tax because of their relationship to the literature in this study.  In 
the domain of corporate tax, there has been plenty of work on tax planning, tax 
avoidance, and corporate responsibility
8
.  The tax planning literature is related to law 
literature and tax avoidance and evasion are more deeply discussed in the economics 
literature (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010).  Corporate responsibility typically can be found in 
the ethics literature. 
The corporate tax planning literature covers the impact that global tax jurisdiction 
has on multinational tax strategy.  Buettner and Wamser (2013) define tax planning as the 
employment of “profit-shifting techniques that only require the adjustment of the internal 
structure of the multinational firm” (pg. 63).  Essentially, companies are employing these 
strategies to reduce tax liability (Donohoe, McGill, & Outslay, 2014; Markie & 
Shackelford, 2012) with mixed or minimal results (Buettner & Wamser, 2013; Donohoe, 
McGill, & Outslay, 2013).
9
  Nevertheless, these tax strategies provide some competitive 
advantage and firms defend their use (Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, & Omer, 2015; 
Manzon, Sharp, & Travlos, 1994). 
                                                 
8
 Corporate responsibility is discussed in detail in the appendix. 
9
 It is important to note that tax avoidance is legal whereas tax evasion is not. 
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Tax avoidance, is the legal minimization of one’s tax liability.  Tax evasion is the 
illegal practice of not filing or paying taxes. Both of these tax strategies, which takes on 
different forms, has been around since the dawn of taxes.  Some common avoidance 
techniques are tax shelters
10
 and complex hybrid securities (Gallemore, Maydew, & 
Thornock, 2014).  Salihu, Sheikh Obid, and Annuar (2013) have defined tax avoidance as 
the action of tax planning or managing of tax liabilities.  Tax avoidance can be measured 
in two ways: reported tax versus financial statements and the proportion of reported tax to 
business income (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010; Salihu et al., 2013).  Donohoe (2015) also 
stated, “Derivatives allow planners to negate, extend, or expand the formal arrangements 
and results on which tax liability is based” (pg.37), creating further tax avoidance. 
As with corporate tax, the personal income literature has investigated critical 
issues related to taxation.  Within this domain, topics include tax reform and tax credits.  
Of all the issues found in the income tax discourse, tax reform is normally at the top.  The 
current Internal Revenue Code has more than 70,000 pages and over 9,000 sections, not 
including regulations and informative publications.  Therefore, it is safe to say that the 
US tax code is complex and its citizenship is interested in reforming it.  Barney, Tschopp, 
and Wells (2012) explain that “frequent change, excessive detail, ambiguity, burdensome 
recordkeeping, numerous calculations, and confusing forms” (pg. 9) makes the tax 
system more complex.  Marcuss et al. (2013) estimated that the cost of tax complexity on 
taxpayers exceed $150 billion in the US.  The complexity is so sizeable that it remains 
the largest cost burden for small business, even after decades of simplification and 
deregulation initiatives (Chittenden, Kauser, & Panikkos, 2003).  Ironically, even 
                                                 
10
 Shelters may or may not be legal, but authors did imply legal action in their paper. 
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simplification measures develop into even more complex tax schemes once deductions 
and exceptions are considered. 
Because of this, studies have established that complexity and vagueness of the 
law are good reasons for taxpayer noncompliance (Beck, Davis, & Woon-Oh Jung, 1992; 
Erard & Ho, 2001; Feinstein, 1991; Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005).  Therefore, ways 
to simplify the US tax code short of a zero-based approach should be welcome. 
One approach critics have offered to simplify the code is the Value Added Tax 
(VAT).  VAT is a consumption tax collected by retailers.  The U.S. House of 
Representatives Bill 25
11 
would impose a national sales tax of 23 percent.
12 
 However, 
economic research has shown that a simple sales tax could be less effective than the 
current income tax system.  A Heritage Foundation report also explains how the 
introduction of a VAT tax would “expand the cost of government,” “inadvertently 
increase income tax rates,” and “slow economic growth and destroy jobs” (no page) 
(Mitchell, 2005).  Jones, Thomas, and Lang (2012) argue that implementation and 
enforcement of VAT policy would still be complex and costly. 
So why is there such an interest in simplifying the code and subsequently the 
filing process? Economist over centuries have asserted the need for tax policy to be easy 
to understand and easy to pay in order to minimize economic distortion, also known as 
deadweight loss (Pressman, 2014).  Data analyzed from Peter, Buttrick, and Duncan 
(2010) has shown that tax complexity in high income nations has not changed over the 
                                                 
11
 The bill was introduced to the House on January 6
th
, 2015 by Georgia Representative Rob Woodall. 
12
 The bill does have exceptions on “intangible property, for property or services purchased for business, 
export, or investment purposes, and for state government functions” (information obtained from 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/25)  
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last two decades
13 
whereas tax rates have gone down during that same timeframe.  They 
showed that progressivity of taxes has declined over the selected period, a trend which is 
indicative of a flatter tax policy (Peter et al., 2010). 
Another way to improve the efficiency of the US Tax Code would be the 
reduction of deductions combined with lower tax rates.  This would increase the tax base 
while reducing the marginal tax rate, a change which should lead to more compliance 
(Gordon, 1989).  Another regime for achieving economic efficiency is a global cap on all 
deductions (Warren, 2014).  A global cap on deductions would not eliminate the 
expenses, but it would reduce the maximum deduction amounts.  By doing this, every 
taxpayer would have the same availability of deduction regardless of expenses (Nagin & 
Pogarsky, 2001).  However, such a global cap would limit those taxpayers with high 
levels of individual deductions. 
Another literature stream in the personal income tax literature deals with credits.  
One of the biggest antipoverty policies for working Americans has been the Earn Income 
Tax Credit (EITC) (Athreya, Reilly, & Simpson, 2010; Blumenthal, Erard, & Chih-Chin, 
2005; de la Vega, 2013).  Much of the EITC literature focuses on how it distorts
14
 the 
economy in terms of income, labor market, and health care.  The EITC creates a 
distortion because individuals with the same yearly income have to pay distinctly 
different effective tax rates (Ordower, 2014).  Thus, they would have different after tax 
income.  Because of the distortion to income and continued compliance malfeasances 
(Blumenthal et al., 2005), there are a few noncompliance audit selection studies which 
                                                 
13
 They explained that the tax complexity has not changed because adjustments to tax laws are made 
continuously in order to avoid bracket creep.  They define bracket creep as the lack of inflationary 
adjustments to the tax code which push taxpayers into higher income brackets due to an increase in nominal 
income. 
14
 The literature showed that the distortions are both positive and negative. 
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use EITC as an indicator for improving IRS personal income tax  audit selection (Erard & 
Ho, 2002; Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005). 
Blumenthal et al. (2005) describe some of the characteristics of EITC non-
compliance.  In their study, they determined that approximately one third of all EITC 
filings are from an ineligible EITC filer.  Many of these unqualified filers were only able 
to pass some of the program’s requirements and improperly claimed EITC in spite of this.  
The authors proposed that cheating filers perceived that auditors could portray their 
actions as an honest mistake. 
In addition to affecting the marginal tax rate of qualifying taxpayers, EITC affects 
health care (Arno, Sohler, Viola, & Schechter, 2009; Averett & Wang, 2013; Kenkel & 
Schmeiser, 2014; Strully, Rehkopf, & Ziming, 2010).  Averett and Wang (2013) argue 
that the increase in income, through a reduction in the effective tax rate, leads to an 
artificial improvement in the health behaviors of EITC recipients.  In addition, research 
has shown that the EITC impact the marginal propensity to consume, a tendency which 
acts as an economic stimulus (Edwards, 2004).  Lastly, the EITC improves labor 
participation and unemployment rates due to increased income, which improves 
willingness to work and marginal return to labor (Neumark & Wascher, 2011; Scholz, 
1994).  Overall, the credits, such as EITC, have an impact on the wellbeing of qualifying 
taxpayers, but could lead to noncompliance through miss use or interpretation. 
Lastly, there is an extensive literature studying the impact of elasticity of taxable 
income with respect to a change in tax rates
15
 (Creedy, 2010; Gordon, 1989; Mosberger, 
2011; Saez, Matsaganis, & Tsakloglou, 2012a; Saez, Slemrod, & Giertz, 2012b).  Creedy 
                                                 
15
 Many of the studies use average or marginal tax rate or net-of-tax rate.  The net-of-tax is income after 
adjusting for taxes. 
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(2010) shows that the level of responsiveness to a change in tax rates (i.e., elasticity) is a 
good measure of income tax burden and an indicator of underreporting of taxable income.  
Dwenger and Steiner (2012) emphasized that the elasticity is a good measurement of 
income tax administration efficiency, but it is not a robust measurement of corporate tax 
efficiency.  Their study reported that the tax profits did not decline with a decrease in the 
corporate tax rate and an inelastic taxable income. Unless the assumption that the market 
is efficient is relaxed, this counters usual economic theory. 
In conclusion, tax literature is broad and deep.  It is also subtly subdivided by 
specific taxation literatures, such as the income and corporate tax literatures.  The present 
literature review provides some understanding of current topics in the general tax 
literature associated with this study.  The literature stream provided in this section shows 
how legal corporate tax planning is linked to tax avoidance.  The personal income 
literature showed how credits and deduction affects the behavior of individual taxpayers 
and how elasticity of income tax can lead to underreporting. 
These literature streams are also related to employment tax and the compliance 
literature, which is at the core of this study.  Specifically, much of the early literature of 
tax compliance looked at the impact taxes have on labor market and compliance, which is 
a major concern in the employment tax literature.  In the next section, the scope of the 
literature review will be further narrowed to employment tax.  Although the relationships 
between income and corporate tax may not be directly linked to the literature of this 
study, smaller businesses do try to minimize their tax liability in order to obtain 
competitive advantage; they engage in tax avoidance and corporate responsibility 
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(Kubick et al., 2015); and they report net operating loss (NOL) deductions like their 
larger counterparts (Planita, 2015).  
IV.2 Employment or Trust Tax 
The Internal Revenue Code refers to the U.S. Code: Title 26, which is divided 
into 11 Subtitles (A to K).  There also are rulings and regulations associated with every 
subtitle further complicating enforcement, compliance, and filing of taxes.  In addition, 
Congress continuously changes the code.  Given this context, we next review the 
literature related to Title 26 U.S. Code Subtitle C (employment taxes). 
The employment tax literature is extensive.  However, a large portion of the 
literature focuses on the legal interpretation and consequences of rulings and law 
changes.  For the purpose of the present study, legal reviews will be considered to be out 
of scope so that we can instead focus on empirical studies.  The idea is to understand the 
current body of knowledge gained from empirical studies in order to understand the 
characteristics of this market segment and to find methods that would be most 
appropriate for scientific analysis.  Much of the empirical employment tax literature 
concentrates on the tax incidence
16
.  The tax incidence is the analysis of who ultimately 
has to pay any enacted taxes.  This literature has focused predominately on how these 
types of taxes affect the labor market and employee wages, and very little tackles the 
issue of taxpayer compliance behavior. 
IV.2.1 Employment Tax Defined 
Employment tax references FUTA, self-employment, social security, and 
Medicare tax withheld from income.  Employment tax is also referred to as trust tax.  It 
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 Tax incident is related to elasticity 
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takes the name trust because employees’ contributions are held in-trust by the employer 
until their contributions  are deposited with the IRS (Murthy, 2014).  In the literature 
review, employment tax is also synonymous with payroll tax and these labels will used 
interchangeably throughout the study. 
An important definition related to employment tax and this study is the assess 
penalty and the duly authorized individual.  Publication 15 states that a recovery penalty 
of 100 percent may be assessed to the firm (and/or duly authorized individuals) if filings 
and deposits do not meet the required obligations and if he/she willfully fails to pay (IRS, 
2013; Murthy, 2014).  Thus the assess penalty is the interested penalty a firm (or officer) 
must pay when it does not meet its tax obligations.  A duly authorized individual is 
defined as an individual or officer who oversee the collection, accounting, and payment 
of employment tax (IRS, 2013).  This definition is important since this was the group of 
individuals that we solicited to participate in this study.  Furthermore, these individuals 
are legally responsible for any liability that occurs.  Last, there is a dearth of research 
attempting to determine why authorized individuals approve illegal tax transactions, 
given the possible negative legal and financial implications. 
IV.2.2 Employment Tax and the Tax Incidence 
In economics, the term-of-art tax incidence
17
 is used as a framing for who 
ultimately is responsible for paying the tax.  The general perception is that the individual 
consuming the product pays the taxes.   However, that is not always the case.  In terms of 
labor markets, the party with the highest price elasticity of labor will pay a smaller 
                                                 
17
 tax incidence is further discussed in the Appendix D 
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portion of any employment tax.  Past research have shown that this is more commonly 
“borne by labour” (pg. 189) (Hamermesh, 1979; Holmlund, 1981; Vroman, 1974). 
Given employers are also subject to employment tax matching, employers may 
exhibit similar behaviors when facing the tax incident.  Empirical evidence suggested that 
a sub-segment of small business – self-employed taxpayers – decreased filing compliance 
and decreased their payment of employment when employment taxes increased (Heim, 
Lurie, & Pearce, 2014). 
Beyond the tax incidence and its impact on labor and wages, payroll tax dilemma 
occurs when a firm cannot meet its operational liabilities and it uses employment tax 
withholdings to pay for these liabilities (Godfrey, 2004; Mauldin & Wilder, 1997).  
Companies normally face a liquidity crisis during economic downturns or economic 
distress, such as the great recession (Grady, 2013).  Grady (2013) indicates that many of 
these businesses continue to illegally borrow from withheld taxes for expanded periods of 
time, and found that the majority of those businesses will eventually fail.  Bloomquist 
(2003a) also argues that a financial strain is one of the determinants of noncompliance for 
all taxpayers.  One of the arguments of this study is that some of the authorized 
individual will succumb to the payroll tax dilemma when confronting a liquidity crisis (or 
strain).   
A different argument from the payroll dilemma is that individuals decide to use 
employment tax withholding as a short-term loan without clearly understanding the 
negative financial implications.  Another explanation is that they are simply taking a high 
interest loan from the federal government.  As these business owners may see it, they 
prefer paying their supplier and staying in business than paying the IRS and go out of 
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business.  There are cases where taxpayers consciously (or unconsciously) make late 
payment.  Given the IRS is unable to identify these individuals until quarter’s end, the 
withholdings could be used to pay other responsibilities.  Then, the employers make 
withholding deposits at the end of the quarter, putting them back to legal standing with 
their federal tax withholding deposits for employment tax and extending their accounts 
payables. 
Yet another explanation for this phenomenon could be derived from individual’s 
perception of the outcome.  This perception could be rooted in self-positivity bias where 
the individual expects a positive outcome or image (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & 
Hankin, 2004) or underestimating risks (Dengfeng & Sengupta, 2013).   In other words, 
these business owners are unable to see how their decision will lead them or their 
business to failure in the long run. 
IV.3 Compliance 
Like taxes, the issue of tax compliance is as old as the Egyptians (Erard, 1997).  
However, the in-depth study of tax compliance began around the late 1960s.  Compliance 
can be defined as conforming or complying with a process.  Roth, Scholz, and Witte 
(1989) define tax compliance as the complete, timely and accurate filing of tax returns.  
Compliance, or lack thereof, is the raison d’être for the IRS.  Taxpayer compliance can be 
sub categorized into three areas: payment, filling, and reporting compliance (Brown & 
Mazur, 2003).  According to Brown and Mazur (2003) these types are exclusive and 
exhaustive. 
So how does the IRS define and enforce compliance?  The definition of 
compliance or tax evasion can be derived from the Second District Court of Appeals and 
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eventual Supreme Court decision of Gregory v. Helvering 293 U.S. 465 (1935).  In their 
decisions, the courts stated that individuals are not bounded under any patriotic duty to 
pay the Treasure or the IRS anything other than what is legally due.
18
 Thus, under the 
accounting principle of substance over form derived from the Supreme Court ruling, 
compliance is met as long as the information is complete and acceptable under the tax 
code.  Otherwise, the act is noncompliant whether the act is deliberate or accidental. 
In general, the IRS measures reporting compliance using the National Research 
Program (NRP).
19
  NRP is a stratified random sample of approximately 50,000
20
 
intensively audited federal income tax returns (Erard, 2002).  From this data, the IRS 
develops internal algorithms for case scoring (known as DIF scores) and case selection 
(Andreoni et al., 1998).  The IRS uses the following procedure to select potential high-
risk noncompliant cases and to enforce compliance: 
“The Unreported Income DIF (UIDIF) score rates the return for the potential of 
unreported income. IRS personnel screen the highest-scoring returns, selecting 
some for audit and identifying the items on these returns that are most likely to 
need review” (no page number) (IRS, 2006). 
It is clear that improving DIF scores will lead to improve case selection and 
eventual voluntary compliance.  Currently, the compliance in the US is estimated to be 
83.1 percent (IRS, 2012a) and probability of an audit is relatively low (IRS, 2014a). 
Kalambokidis, Turk, and Blumenthal (2012) showed that approximately 10 percent of 
                                                 
18
 The Supreme Court states: “The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would 
be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law,” The Second District Court of Appeals 
states: “Anyone may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to 
choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's 
taxes” (69 F.2d 811). 
19
 The Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) is the predecessor of the NRP program. 
20
 Number obtained from http://www.irs.gov/uac/National-Research-Program-(NRP). 
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subjects in an experiment would be fully non-compliant.  Even though the majority of 
individuals will do the right thing, a consistent reduction in audit rates can erode the long-
term voluntary compliance rates.  To avoid the potential erosion of voluntary compliance 
and maintain the high level of voluntary compliance, some researchers propose 
increasing the use of record matching, such as the W-2s and the Information Reporting 
and Document Matching (IRDM) (Andreoni et al., 1998; Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 
2005; Scholz, 2003).   
Record matching strategies has proven to be a useful to alleviate the tax evasion.  
For example, over 97 percent of wage earners are compliant (Clotfelter, 1983; Martinez-
Vazquez & Rider, 2005; Slemrod, 1985).  This segment of the taxpaying population has a 
very high level of record matching.  In addition, 90 percent of investment income is 
compliant (Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005; Slemrod, 1985) and this number is likely to 
increase with the introduction of the Form 1099-K in 2009.  Again, this high level of 
compliance behavior can be attributed to a high level of record match.  On the other hand 
47 percent of small business and partnerships are compliant (Slemrod, 1985), and this 
low compliance rate is in part attributed to the low level of record matching.  Some 
studies have shown that out of all business entities studied, partnerships are more 
complaint because it would require collusion from all the partners to underreport 
(Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005).   
This issue is not exclusive to type of taxpayer or form utilized to report.  
Noncompliance is also more evident in individual line items reported within certain form.  
For example, the majority of Form 1040 line items have some method of record 
matching.  The one exception is cash contributions and this area exhibits a higher rate of 
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noncompliance (Blumenthal, Kalambokidis, & Turk, 2012; Turk, Muzikir, Blumenthal, 
& Kalambokidis, 2007).   
In addition to of record matching, IRS Commissioner Koskinen (2015) expressed 
concern in a key note address at the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center about the 
potential erosion of voluntary compliance because of the impact of budgetary cuts on 
detection and enforcement.  His concern is possibly due in part to empirical evidence, 
which has shown that increased probability of detection of noncompliance and 
enforcement will reduce the intentional and accidental noncompliance rates (Alm, 
Jackson, & McKee, 1992; Bloomquist, 2009; Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1992; 
Hasseldine, Hite, & Toumi, 2007).  Indeed, Joulfaian and Rider (1998) calculated a seven 
percent compliance improvement when the probability of audit increased ten percent.  In 
addition, studies have shown that there is a lag effect on compliance when the audit rate 
decreases (White & Woodbury, 1985).  In addition Alm and Yunus (2009) have found 
that the presence of a continual tax audit (termed “persistence”) has a short and long term 
effect on compliance behavior.  The sections below will provide a more focused review 
on filing and reporting compliance and payment compliance. 
IV.3.1 Filing and Reporting Compliance 
In general, taxpayers will report their incomes, expenses, credits, and deductions.  
Expenses, credits, and deductions will reduce taxpayers’ taxable income while 
compensations will increase them.  Filing compliance is the complete, timely, and 
accurate submission of forms to authorities and the amounts disclosed to authorities on 
filed tax forms are considered reported amounts.  Therefore, reporting and filing 
compliance is the complete, timely, and accurate disclosure of tax information on all 
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sources of compensation.  Underreporting, or reporting noncompliance, is the difference 
between reported amount and actual amounts incurred during the year.  It is simply the 
understated amount of tax liability owed at the time of filing (Plumley, 2006).  Reporting 
noncompliance may be a product of overstating expenses, credits, and deductions or the 
understating of incomes. 
One of the cornerstone of tax compliance literature is the simple model of rational 
crime theorized by Becker (1968).  Becker’s (1968) crime and punishment optimization 
model  illustrates how the cost of the crime, the cost of the apprehension and conviction, 
and the number of offences work as determining factors for crime deterrence.  This 
model is based on expected utility theory.  Expected utility provides a model that 
explains attitudes toward risk.  In this case, it is a model that explains attitudes towards 
the risk of an audit. 
This model shows that as the social cost increases, deterrence increases.  Thus, a 
higher number of offenses lead to a higher probability for deterrence because of the cost 
associated or incurred by each offence.  On the other hand, if individuals are not punished 
for their offences, the cost of noncompliance decreases.  This motivates taxpayers using 
“tax rate, detection probability, and penalty structure” (pg. 2) to reassess compliance 
behavior and potentially become less compliant (Fischer et al., 1992). 
Conversely, the higher the cost of apprehension and conviction (or our synonym 
punishment) lead to a lower probability of deterrence.  This negative correlation assumes, 
quite rightly, that detection is not perfect.  This is due to the fact that the social cost of 
committing a crime can, at times, be less costly than the cost of punishing the perpetrator 
(i.e., cost of crime < cost of punishment) and must take in to account the fact that the 
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majority of noncompliant are marginally noncompliant making enforcement less 
advantageous for authorities.  Therefore, authorities, such as the IRS, should at a 
minimum attempt to optimize enforcement where the cost of the crime is at least equal to 
the cost of punishment.  Preferably, they should optimize enforcement by maximizing the 
dollars generated per hour of enforcement from each audit class. 
The IRS could pursue this optimization via a model such as the one developed by 
Becker.  However if detection and punishment were the only predictors of compliance, 
noncompliance would be much lower (Alm, 1991).  Fischer et al. (1992) provide four 
categories that more completely measure of compliance and emphasize how detection 
probability is at the core of all the models.  These categories of detection probability 
are:
21
 
 Demographic: “age, gender” (pg. 2)  
 Socioeconomic:  “education, income level, income source, and occupation” (pg. 
2) 
 Normative Beliefs and Subjective Norms: “ethics, perceived fairness of the tax 
system, peer influence” (pg. 2) 
 Tax law: “complexity of the tax system, IRS contact, sanctions, detection 
probability, and tax rates” (pg. 2) 
The second cornerstone of the tax compliance literature was advanced by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which was later refined in Yitzhaki (1974).  As with 
Becker, this model is also based on expected utility theory.  Allingham and Sandmo 
argued that rational individuals, when facing multistage situation, will analyze their filing 
decision using outcomes from prior filing and expected future cost of apprehension.  
Their model identified a positive relationship between the magnitude of a tax penalty and 
tax compliance.  In other words, higher penalties will lead to higher compliance.  
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 All variables mentioned in the categories are provided by the Fischer et al. paper. Other papers state that 
there are 14 variables, but none mentions which ones they are. 
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The Allingham & Sandmo model breaks down the decision process into several 
steps.  First, taxpayers must decide how much to report, and that decision is followed by 
the decision to pay (Erard & Ho, 2001).  Their original model was: 
                                22 
Where E(U) is the expected utility; p is the probability of detection (or audit); W 
is income; X is reported income; Θ is the tax rate; and π is the penalty rate.  If W is 
greater than X, there is a tax gap.  Simply, the right side of the equation provided a 
formula of the gains                and the cost                  
associated with the final reporting decision.  As mentioned above and using Formula, 
when the probability of detection (p) or penalty (Θ) increases, reporting improves 
because the cost increases beyond the gains from underreporting.  
Using this model, Clotfelter (1983), Gordon (1989), Alm et al. (1992), and 
Andreoni et al. (1998)  argued that an increase in the tax rate will increase noncompliance 
when the probability of getting apprehended remains constant.  For example, the 
Andreoni et al. line of reasoning showed that the after-tax income benefits increase as a 
result of underreporting while the expected cost of apprehension (i.e., audit) remain 
constant.  If the tax policy’s goal is to minimize tax evasion, any increase in taxes should 
be accompanied by an increase in tax enforcement or an increase in penalties to restrain 
any changes to the compliance rate.  The result expressed by Andreoni et al. is similar to 
those observed with other assets or normal goods (Stiglitz, 1969) and what is expected 
using expected utility maximization under uncertainty (Alm et al., 1992; Clotfelter, 1983; 
Lee, 2001; Stiglitz, 1969).  This notion is consistent throughout the entire literature. 
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 There many more refinements of this model in the paper and in the literature, but investigator will use 
this model for simplicity.  However, another simple model could have been used: the multistage model 
                         where    is the gain and    is the cost associated with being discovered. 
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Using the Allingham and Sandmo model, Lee (2001) asseverates that rational 
individuals will purposely become noncompliant and will self-insure in the event of an 
audit.  He argues that rational individuals are willing to engage in tax evasion when the 
probability of detection is low (Lee, 2001) and he suggests that noncompliant taxpayers 
will use some of the proceeds from not paying taxes as a self-insurance policy in the 
event of an audit.  This strategy becomes viable provided the proceeds from 
underreporting exceed the cost of audits over an extended period.  On the other hand, if 
the audit rate increases, the scheme becomes less lucrative and the self-insured tax 
evaders will increase their compliance behavior. 
In addition to tax rate and penalties, Allingham and Sandmo’s model also 
explored the issue of asymmetry of information (taxpayers have more information about 
their transactions than the enforcing authority).  They formulate a relationship between 
the uncertainty associated with tax declarations and asymmetric information.  Their 
premise was that the presence of asymmetric information increases the level of 
uncertainty.  This effect is more prevalent with the absence of third party matching.  
Their model showed how higher uncertainty coupled with the fact that underreporting by 
the taxpayer does not automatically trigger a reporting penalty or an audit will inevitably 
lead to underreporting. 
Their model was able to measure the relationship between higher detection and 
improved income reporting, but was not able to find the relationship between income and 
reporting (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Alm et al., 1992).  In addition, the Alm et al. 
(1992) study showed that due to the lack of reliable information on individual compliance 
choices and the presence of asymmetric information in any tax transaction may lead 
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taxpayers to take on riskier behaviors.  This finding is aligned with other studies 
discussed above and the results could be rooted in an individual’s perception of the 
likelihood of sanction (i.e., probability of detection).  The Andreoni et al. (1998) and Lee 
(2001) studies indicate that detection and punishment are not the only predictors of 
compliant behavior.  Alm (1991) explained that if detection and punishment were the 
only predictors of noncompliance, noncompliance should have increased in the US for all 
sources of income without third party matching.  Furthermore, he explains that studies 
have shown taxpayers in many circumstances have failed to maximize their expected 
utilities.  Given these shortcomings in the models (both Becker’s and later Allingham and 
Sandmo’s model), researchers have undertaken numerous studies to understand and 
explain the sources and characteristics of noncompliance.  The next two subsections 
discuss the topics of sources and characteristics of noncompliance, which should provide 
a clear understanding of the discrepancies and inconsistencies observed in tax compliance 
behavior. 
IV.3.1.1 Sources of Compliance (or Noncompliance) 
There are different sources of tax compliance.  Some of these differences are very 
subtle, and in other cases, the literature has not reached a consensus because of 
contradictory results.  For example, game theory and principle agent models have shown 
that taxpayers’ perceptions regarding the probability of detection are relatively accurate.  
Whereas, Scholz (2003) argued that the taxpayers’ have “inaccurate beliefs about” (pg. 
186) the probability of detection, and Alm et al. (1992) explained that in most case 
taxpayers will over estimate audit rate.  Furthermore, those individuals who have a risk-
seeking personality will modify their probability of detection perception more 
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significantly than those who are risk-adverse (Schulz, 2014).  Nevertheless, Andreoni et 
al. (1998) suggested that taxpayers are unable to determine the sources that triggered the 
audits or the magnitude of the penalties related to noncompliance.  Moreover, individual 
with different risk aversion levels will modify their probability of detection after 
experiencing tax filing results or audits.  This is the notion of persistence.  
In addition, compliance may be impacted by the presence of a refund or an 
amount owed.  Robben et al. (1990) suggested that taxpayers who are receiving a refund 
are more risk adverse because they are already owed money back and would be subject to 
a loss if cheating were identified.  On the other hand, those who owe money have the 
lower perceived risk of noncompliance because they have already incurred a loss.  If not 
apprehended, the losses are minimized. 
Another source of noncompliance is asymmetry of information.  Studies 
mentioned above have claim that individuals have asymmetry information and that the 
cost of punishment has an impact on compliance.  However, up to this point, they have 
not explained what some of the sources of underreporting are.  In most cases, firms and 
individuals will underreport their source of income wherever taxpayers perceive the 
sources are harder for authorities to identify (Johns & Slemrod, 2010).  For example, the 
IRS reports that most of its tax gap underreporting is income understating instead of the 
overstating deductions or credits (Erard, 2002; Johns & Slemrod, 2010; Winchester, 
2009).  Studies have shown that income underreporting is subtle, and can materialize in 
different forms. 
For example, Beck, Davis, and Jung (1991) explained that introduction of 
penalties and changes in audit probability impacts behavior.  This is consistent with other 
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studies, but they determined that the changes are dependent on risk aversion.  Alm et al. 
(1992) study also showed that the frequency of audit also has a positive impact on 
taxpayer compliance, and that reward could encourage compliance.  In Robben’s et al. 
(1990) study, businesses that were expecting a refund (a reward) in excess of $1,000 were 
compliant 95 percent of the time. Whereby, businesses with balance due of $1,000 were 
compliant 70 percent of the time.
 
 The same study showed that individual taxpayer 
compliance rate was 96 percent and 89 percent respectively.  This example is called a 
“balance due effect” (pg. 684) (Joulfaian & Rider, 1998), and it implies that the tax 
liability threshold have an impact on taxpayers’ decision to underreport. 
Another source of underreporting was associated with the complexity of the 
return or high filing burden.  Individual filling with additional schedules (especially 
Schedule C, D, and F) and forms were more likely to underreport (Blumenthal et al., 
2005; Clotfelter, 1983; Feinstein, 1991).  One explanation may be a consequence of 
increased burden.  The burden on compliance has been estimated at $100 billion dollars.  
Burden is calculated using the IRS Individual Burden Model, which accounts in dollars 
the hours and moneys spent on completing and filing tax forms.  Assuming the taxpayers 
are willing to self-insure, as Lee explained, and they use a model similar to Allingham 
and Sandmo’s model, it would not be hard to conclude that noncompliance in a highly 
complex return is a practical solution.  Clotfelter also propose that different taxpayer 
segments will underreport differently.  For example a wage earner, whose income is 
matched, will over state deduction and credits.  On the other hand, businesses are more 
likely to underreport by boosting their operating expenses. 
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Similar to Robben et al. and Clotfelter, Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) found 
that increase enforcement is an effective way of increasing overall compliance.  
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider (2005) study showed that the increased enforcement on a 
mode
23
 will increase income compliance, but it will have adverse effect on the untreated 
modes.  Their study illustrated how 46 percent of returns understated income and about 
half of these had overstated deduction, which was in accordance with other studies.  
Martinez-Vazquez and Rider argued that taxpayers will determine which modes 
authorities are focusing their enforcement (i.e., understating income or overstating 
deductions) to reassess their probability of detection.  They argue this is an application of 
a substitution effect.  Once filing results are reassessed, taxpayers switch from 
underreporting income to over reporting deduction or vice versa.  Therefore, gains in 
compliance are driven exclusively by graters gains in the targeted mode, which have a 
larger dollar impact than the loses from the mode not targeted. 
In addition, they argue that taxpayers’ decision to be noncompliant is driven in 
part by the presence of third party verification, which is in line with other studies 
presented in this paper.  Blumenthal et al. (1998) also found that income level has an 
impact on reporting when there is enforcement and recode matching.  They found that 
lower income taxpayers were more likely to increase the income reporting after being 
informed of an impending audit.  On the other hand, higher income filer reduced the tax 
income reporting after being informed of an impending audit.  Blumenthal et al. (1998) 
and Erard (1993) argue that this may be due to the hiring of tax professionals, which 
prefer more aggressive reporting activities. 
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income and deductions.  The modes used in the Martinez-Vazquez and Rider are income and deduction 
reporting compliance.  
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With respect to business compliance, this too is a source of noncompliance.  
Although, there has been relatively little research completed exclusively on business 
noncompliance (Alm, 1991), the presence of self-employment income indicates higher 
probability of noncompliance.  Newer studies do provide some insight on this segment’s 
compliance behavior.  For example, sole proprietors have shown to underreport 
employment taxes liability as well as their income (Joulfaian & Rider, 1998; Kukk & 
Staehr, 2013; Pissarides & Weber, 1989) and the type of industry also has an impact on 
the compliance level (Nor, Ahmad, & Saleh, 2010).   
More persuasive evidence that self-employed business are a source of 
noncompliance is that the reporting compliance for this group is substantially lower than 
those of wage earning tax payers.  Their voluntary compliance is between 40 and 80 
percent depending on the income source,
24
 and much lower than wage earners.  One of 
the study showing the voluntary compliance of employment tax around 50 percent lower 
than personal income (Joulfaian & Rider, 1998).  While the manifestation of 
underreporting income falls in line with the rest of the filing population (Blumenthal et 
al., 2005; Erard & Ho, 2001), the magnitude of underreporting is greater for small 
business and sole proprietors (Joulfaian & Rider, 1998; Slemrod, 1985).   
As with individual tax filing, the complexity of the code has an impact on small 
business and self-employment filings compliance.  Smalls businesses use tax preparers 
because of the complexity of the code.  Erard (1993) found that tax professionals, 
especially CPA and tax lawyers, are “more likely to approve of aggressive reporting 
activities” (pg. 167), which are more likely to end up audited and noncompliant.  Also, 
Erard (1997) argues that taxpayers’ perceived probability of  detection is diminished 
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when employing a tax preparer to complete and file their tax returns.  He argues the 
hiring of tax professionals further increasing their chances of noncompliance of business 
and self-employment tax.  Ironically, he proposed that voluntary compliance would 
increase if taxpayers would complete their own tax forms.  His reasoning is that the 
results showed self-prepared returns are more compliant in subsequent years after an 
audit.  Whereas, returns completed by tax professionals were less compliant in 
subsequent years after an audit. 
Given that individual filings include some employment tax requirements through 
the filing of Schedule C or Schedule F, some studies have shown that these forms are an 
indicator of underreporting of employment tax and general noncompliance (Erard, 1997; 
Joulfaian & Rider, 1998).  A recurring reason for the underreporting has been linked to 
the lack record matching in the past.  Interestingly, sole proprietors and farmers, both of 
which are considered small business by the IRS, were exempt from record matching 
(Andreoni et al., 1998).  This exemption implied that the probability of detection was 
lower.  Ceteris paribus, the changes in the code and improved technological capabilities 
for these taxpayers
 25
 should lead to improved detection of noncompliance and eventually 
improve compliance rate for this population.   
Another important small business self-employment finding relates to the balance 
due effect.   The balance due effect is the amount that taxpayers has not paid by April 15 
on his/her tax liability.  This finding is important because how much a taxpayer owes on 
April 15 is an indication of noncompliance.  Meaning, the greater the balance due amount 
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 The 2009 changes to Sections 6041, 6041A, 6050W, and 6051 requires third party payment settlement 
organizations to report payment transactions to the IRS for the purpose of record matching, and 
employment and income tax enforcement. 
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the more likely they are to underreporting and become noncompliant (Joulfaian & Rider, 
1998). 
Finally, noncompliance detection is dependent on systematic and unsystematic 
components and the results of audits are imperfect (Feinstein, 1991).  All the variables 
discussed above could be considered systematic components.  They are generalization of 
the population.  On the other hand, unsystematic components are dependent on both the 
individual behavior of the taxpayer and the knowledge of the IRS’ examiner.  Feinstein 
(1991) correctly explain that the revenue agents have different grades and different 
capabilities between grades and the nature of the return they examine may be 
substantially different.
26
  All these differences in returns and examiner level will lead to 
different probability of detection.  The model developed by Feinstein is useful when 
developing a partial detection model because it takes into account complexity of the 
return and the ability of the examiner when assessing probability of detection.  It is also 
useful IRS policy because the author explains that training and better employment 
screening would lead to better probability of detection.  This is an issue the Service 
continues to have two decades after the publication of Feinstein’s paper.  
IV.3.1.2 Characteristics of Noncompliant Taxpayers 
In the literature, there are two groups on noncompliant taxpayers: those who file 
and underreport and those who do not file.  First, review of the characteristics of 
underreporters will be provided and then provide a brief overview the non-filers.
27
  
Collins and Plumlee (1991) and Feinstein (1991) studies provide evidence that 
underreporting increased as income level, effort or marginal cost increases.  In addition, 
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 For example, one case may have a simple Form 1040.  At the other end of the complexity scale, a case 
may have a Form 1040 plus several schedules, including schedule K-1 flow-through. 
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 A more in-depth discussion of non-filers is available in Appendix D. 
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studies have found that age, more specifically students and working adults, have a 
different “tax mentality” (pg. 20), implying different taxpayer behavior and sophistication 
(Beck et al., 1991; Blumenthal et al., 2005; Fischer et al., 1992).  Lastly, many of the 
studies have found that prior filing is a good indication of future filing behavior (Erard & 
Ho, 2001).  
Beck et al. (1991) also provide evidence that risk neutral individuals will increase 
their reported income “when penalty rates, audit probabilities” (pg. 536) and uncertainty 
increase.  Their model also showed that risk neutral taxpayers behave the same way
28
 as 
risk adverse taxpayers.  In addition, they determined that the risk-neutral model is more 
robust than prior risk preference models.  Furthermore, other studies have shown that 
filing status could be a predictor of noncompliance.  More specifically, studies have 
shown that married individuals are more likely to underreport (Andreoni et al., 1998; 
Clotfelter, 1983).   
With respect to employment tax, very little is mentioned in the literature about the 
characteristics of noncompliance.  However, there is sufficient information about owners 
of small businesses to assess their compliance behavior.  However to do so, self-
employee compliance characteristics will be used as proxy to understand employment tax 
filing behavior because of the similarity in the population segment.  Feinstein (1991) 
found that taxpayers’ filing with Schedule C (Self-employed) and Schedule F (Farming) 
are more likely to be noncompliant that other taxpayers.  With respect to farmers, he 
found that much of the underreporting occurs with income item (adjusted gross income).  
Further complicating matters and increasing the probability of noncompliance, Erard 
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al. used “marginally significant” when the p-value was .077. 
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(1997) found that many returns with schedules such as schedule C, D, E, F and K-1 will 
disproportionately use tax preparers and increasing the probability of noncompliance.  
Joulfaian and Rider (1998) also found that by including employment tax (i.e. Schedule C 
and Schedule F) the probability of noncompliance increases with an increase in the tax 
rate.  Also if an individual has evaded taxes in the past without any enforcement 
response, there will be an “element of persistence” (pg.101) in the taxpayer’s compliance 
behavior (Alm & Yunus, 2009). 
Now that some characteristics of underreporters have been discussed, a brief 
overview of non-filers is essential because their presence (or lack thereof) increase biases 
on the outcome.  This subgroup of taxpayers also creates the appearance lower fraudulent 
levels, and understanding their behaviors improves our understanding of compliance 
(Feinstein, 1991).  Erard and Ho’s (2001) explained that certain characteristics, such as 
hard to find, youth, married and blue collar, are traits of non-filers.  Inevitably, 
complexity of filing and business income are at the core of non-filers compliance. 
IV.3.1.3 Audit Regimes and Compliance 
An audit is a “review/examination of an organization's or individual's accounts 
and financial information to ensure information is being reported correctly, according to 
the tax laws, to verify the amount of tax reported is substantially correct” (no page) (IRS, 
2015).  According to the IRS (2015), there are three ways and individual or organization 
may be selected for and audit: random, document matching, and related examinations.  
Audits could take place in person or simply a review of records.  There are three results 
from an audit: no change, change with agreement, and change with disagreement. 
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The experimental design literature shows that this is a key variable in any 
compliance model for both the filer and the authorities (Alm et al., 1992).  The 
probability of detection is analogous to the probability of an audit.  Many studies in this 
literature have shown that individuals will alter their reporting and paying behavior based 
on probability of audit, and the severity and celerity of enforcement.  As a matter of a 
fact, the impact of an audit that results in an amount change is six times larger because 
audited taxpayers will interact with other taxpayers and it will cause other taxpayers to 
voluntarily comply (Alm, Jackson, & McKee, 2004).  While this is a great signal to 
taxpayer by authorities, the audit rate in the United States had decrease from six percent 
to about one percent over the last four decades, but it depends on different criteria.  The 
budgetary results associated with this reduction to the audit rates have been calculated to 
be approximately seven billion dollars (Alm et al., 2004). 
Before providing further information on the relationship between audit and 
compliance, a definition of audit is in order.  Collins and Plumlee (1991) study is one of 
the first studies to define alternative audit rules, and they have categorized them into 
three distinct rules: 
 Random audit 
 Cut-off audit 
 Conditional (or strategic) audit 
A random audit rule is when all taxpayers have the same probability of being 
selected (Collins & Plumlee, 1991). Cut-off audit rule establishes in advance a dollar 
threshold that triggers an audit.  So any time a taxpayer reports an amount below the 
established threshold, an audit will be conducted (Andreoni et al., 1998).  Conditional 
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rules use selection criteria and population segmentation to modify the probability of 
detection, and it uses the taxpayer’s reported information for case selection (Clark, 
Friesen, & Muller, 2004).  Selection criteria could be line items such as filing status, 
number of dependents or reported amounts, and population segmentations are “pools”29 
that can be created using prior audit results or case type (e.g., different forms – 1040-EZ, 
1040 with additional schedules, and 1040 with partnership income).  
As mentioned in the tax literature, the best way to accurately determine taxpayer 
compliance would be to use random audits.  However, random audits are too costly.  
Thus, it could not be operationalized.  The cut-off rule has shown to be useful, but only 
when taxpayers are risk neutral.  Therefore, the cut-off audit is not viable as and 
optimization strategy because it is too restrictive to operationalize.  Lastly, conditional 
“are designed to achieve regulatory compliance with fewer inspections than required by 
random auditing” (pg. 60) (Clark et al., 2004) and the impact of conditional audits 
decreases underreporting as income increases (Beck et al., 1992; Collins & Plumlee, 
1991). 
Another positive implication of audits is the existence of a lag effect, which 
makes taxpayers compliant over several perriods (White & Woodbury, 1985).  On the 
other hand, the impacts of audits are not estimated to last over a long period of time 
(Andreoni et al., 1998), but they do persist (Alm & Yunus, 2009).  They are short-term 
event.  So in terms of tax policy, using simple but frequent record matching audits that 
would signal ‘surveillance’ to average taxpayers may be a good policy for the IRS to 
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incorporate as part of their compliance efforts
30
 and would minimize persistence of tax 
evasion.  
In essence, the IRS audit strategies are similar to conditional (or strategic) audit 
rule used to determine the probability of detection and appear to be the best plausible 
option available for the authorities.  On the other hand, Alm et al. (1992) warns that audit 
levels similar to those employed by the IRS have a low impact on reporting compliance 
in the long-run.  This low audit rate combined with short term behavioral effects of audits 
suggest that enforcement has to be continual (again addressing the importance of 
frequency), especially for those individual who are risk loving or have not been audited 
for some time.  Nevertheless, conditional tax audit appear to be the most successful audit 
regime. 
Lastly, Beck et al. (1992) provide some insights on the important of implicit and 
explicit costs of an audit.  Even when no change is the result of an audit, taxpayers have 
to incur implicit and explicit costs.  These costs may include the hiring of a tax 
professional, increased hours in preparation and increase stress.  Beck et al. (1992) claim 
that this increased cost due to an audit, which cannot easily be tested in and experimental 
setting, will increases the risk aversion of taxpayers.  They expect these costs to be a 
source for less aggressive compliance behavior than those observed in their experiments.  
IV.3.2 Payment Compliance 
Filing compliance means the complete, timely, and accurate filing of taxes.  If 
taxes are accurately filed, then payment compliance implies no underpayment and a 
timely payment.  On the other hand, the literature has provided countless evidence to the 
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existance of such examples are the balance due effect and the payroll tax dilemma.  In the 
section below, a review of the payment literature is presented though it is important to 
stress that much of the payment compliance literature is linked to the general tax 
compliance literature and the models covered above.  In addition, most of the literature 
focuses on filing and not exclusively on the payment of taxes.  Many times, payment 
compliance appears to be a secondary element in studies rather than a primary research 
focus. 
Nevertheless, the concept of payment compliance is important because it is 
essential to the notion of equity and efficiency.  As some of the studies mentioned 
(Andreoni et al., 1998; Erard, 1997; Erard & Ho, 2001; Fischer et al., 1992; Gordon, 
1989), the perceived fairness of the tax code will affect compliance in general.  Without 
ensuring that all (or almost) taxpayers pay their legally incurred tax liabilities, a sense of 
inequity and inefficiency becomes pervasive in the consciousness of the tax base.  In 
1988, 40 percent of households underpaid their tax liabilities according to a tax gap 
analysis (Andreoni et al., 1998).  This statistic along with the assertion that slightly over 
90 percent of households voluntarily report their taxes (itself a low rate, we would argue) 
shows a disconnect between people’s perception of filing compliance and payment 
compliance. 
The payment of taxes on earned income is a requirement and taxpayers must 
make payments by year’s end (IRS, 2014b).  However, many individuals make ongoing 
payments using withholding or estimated tax payments in order to avoid potential 
penalties and interest.  Therefore, taxpayers make calculated assessments of their 
expected withholdings and estimated tax payments on their income as the tax year 
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progress in order to avoid the penalties and interest.  As part of this calculated 
assessment, taxpayers also seek to minimize the risk of providing an interest free loan to 
the government (i.e. federal and state).  In doing so, taxpayers may underreport income 
and may underpay on the actual tax liability accumulated.   
In the Feltham and Paquette (2002) study, the authors argue that individuals who 
do not adequately report and pay their tax withholdings or estimated tax payments were 
more likely to underreport.  This idea is central to the current study because it could be 
anticipated that employers will underreport their employment tax liability whenever they 
are faced with a liquidity problem.  This underreporting behavior should eventually 
morph into a behavior of persistent underpayment given the presence of uncertainty of an 
audit and perceived behavior control. 
In concussion, studies have shown that individuals will comply with payments 
when enforcement is increased (Alm et al., 1992; Bloomquist, 2009; Hasseldine et al., 
2007).  We also know from the literature mentioned above (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; 
Andreoni et al., 1998; Becker, 1968; Clotfelter, 1983; Fischer et al., 1992; Lee, 2001) that 
authorities make calculated assessment to determine the benefits associated with the 
prosecution of crimes.  On the other hand, the literature (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; 
Andreoni et al., 1998; Becker, 1968; Fischer et al., 1992) also mentions that individuals 
make similar assessment to determine the benefits associated with reporting and payment 
compliance.  Both of these calculations are formulated, in essence, by using asymmetric 
information and probability of uncertainty. 
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IV.3.3 Income Shock  
Berloffa and Modena (2013) define negative income shock as the loss of revenues 
over a period.  Hryshko (2014) suggest that households are only able to adjust to a 
negative income shock as long as the reduction of income is between 8 to 25 percent.  
Carroll (2009) further explains the difference between transitory and permanent income 
shock, where transitory income shock relates to short-term changes in income and 
permanent income shock relates to long-term income shock.  In this study, the income 
shock was identified a transitory and it consists of a 16.5 percent reduction in revenue.  
The percentage selected is the median of the range provided by Hryshko (2014).   
IV.4 Literature Review Summary 
In conclusion, taxpayer compliance, like many other human behaviors, can take 
on subtle differences.  Research has shown that marginal tax rate, probability of 
detection, and penalties will have all an impact on compliance.  Additionally, social 
characteristics of the taxpayer will affect compliance.  Some of these social 
characteristics are marital status and age.  Furthermore, studies have found some 
economic characteristics that are associated with noncompliance.  Most of these 
characteristics deal with the filing of self-employment or business tax.   
In addition, there is consensus in the literature that compliance is also driven by 
the level of satisfaction with the government and the perceived fairness of the tax system.  
If individuals believe the government is properly working and everyone is paying their 
fair share of taxes, compliance increases.  Lastly, the complexity of the tax system and 
the presence of third party reporting have an impact on the filing compliance.  In other 
words, complexity introduces ambiguity.  This ambiguity leads to overstating deductions 
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and credits and underreporting income.  The lack of third party reporting makes it harder 
for an authority to verify and because of this asymmetry of information, taxpayers 
comply less often. 
With respect to audit methods, the consensus is that conditional audit rules are the 
most effective way to address noncompliant taxpayer and to increase enforcement.  These 
audit methods are similar to those used by the IRS.  Even though the literature recognizes 
conditional audit rules as the best option, all the experimental studies reviewed in this 
section have used a random audit design.  Moreover, many of these studies have random 
audit rates that are operationally unrealistic because of high levels of audit rates.  None of 
the studies have addressed or recommended a standard to correctly address this issue and 
the tax compliance literature has identified this is as a limitation of prior experimental 
designs.  Joulfaian and Rider (1998) have calculated the predicted probability of an audit 
to be between 4.3 and 5.7 percent.  This range accounts for different conditional audit 
rule of income tax, but does not account for employment tax audit rates.  Furthermore, 
these rates vary because of the IRS usage of discriminant functions analysis for the 
selection of cases (Beck et al., 1992), and this is a reason for why taxpayers are unsure 
about the probability of detection.  
With respect to research methods, there is consensus in the literature that 
econometric models have been useful in identifying characteristics of noncompliance.  
There is also a consensus that experimental design can be used to better understand the 
subtle differences that complex econometric models are unable to identify due to 
redundancy (or multicollinearity). 
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V THEORY 
V.1 Theoretical Motivation 
The theoretical motivation of this study is to enhance our understanding of 
taxpayers’ antisocial behavior using General Deterrence Theory.  Deterrence is the 
impact that punishment has on those who have not committed a criminal act (Blumstein, 
Cohen, & Nagin, 1978).  In terms of tax enforcement, deterrence is the impact tax audits 
and their accompanying punishments, such as interest, penalties, and imprisonment, have 
on those individuals who have failed to report and pay taxes their tax requirements.  
General Deterrence Theory has been used in different fields such as: criminal justice 
(Lawes, 1927; Schelling, 1958; Tittle, Botchkovar, & Antonaccio, 2011), international 
relations (Kalplowitz, 1973; Quackenbush, 2010, 2011b), economics (Homburg, Fürst, 
Ehrmann, & Scheinker, 2013; Rhee, 2012), and information systems (Chen, 
Ramamurthy, & Wen, 2012; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015; Lijiao, Wenli, 
Qingguo, & Smyth, 2014; Straub & Welke, 1998).  The theory is based on the general 
idea of homo economicus – people are rational and they respond to incentives (Blumstein 
et al., 1978). 
Using this basic economic principle, it would be safe to assume that rational 
individuals will partake in certain tax behaviors if the marginal benefit is equal or greater 
than the marginal cost.  Consequently, tax decisions are determined at the margins 
(Phillips, 2014).  The simple model of rational crime (SMORC) states that there are two 
methods to increase individuals’ marginal cost: (1) higher probability of being 
apprehended and (2) increased magnitude of punishment (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; 
Ariely, 2012; Upadhyay, 2013).  Furthermore, studies have shown that individuals will 
improve their compliance rate when enforcement is increased or the enforcement of 
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punishment is creditable (Alm et al., 1992; Bloomquist, 2009; Hasseldine et al., 2007; 
Kalplowitz, 1973; Lijiao et al., 2014).  Individuals, firms, and authorities will undertake a 
cost-benefit analysis to determine whether they should misbehave or prosecute, 
respectively (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Rhee, 2012).  In addition, asymmetric 
information will play a part in the final analysis (Alm et al., 1992; Ariely, 2012; Mazar & 
Ariely, 2006; Vitell, 2003) and noncompliance will increase if transaction visibility 
decreases (Andreoni et al., 1998; Bloomquist, 2003b; Roth et al., 1989). 
General Deterrence Theory provides an explanation as to how different levels of 
punishment influence antisocial behavior.  Its economic foundation is based on 
optimization of expected utility, which is one of the most common theories used to 
explain tax compliance behavior.  In general, the measurement of deterrence can be 
achieved by calculating the change in criminal rates at different levels of punishment 
(Blumstein et al., 1978).  The current study will test the change in payment behavior 
when different levels of certainty (i.e., probability of detection) are imposed. 
V.2 General Deterrence Theory 
V.2.1 Background 
In the older compliance literature, most of the theoretical focus was on economic 
theory centered on labor and utility theory.  The newer papers refer to decision-making 
and maximization of expected utility function under uncertainty and risk aversion (Alm, 
1991; Alm & Yunus, 2009; Lee, 2001; Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, 2005).  Most of the 
studies on tax compliance refer to the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model which is 
based on expected utility derived from a 1944 von Neumann-Morganstern (1974), which 
includes the inclusion of risk.  The economic basis for General Deterrence Theory is thus 
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based on utility theory.  Therefore, General Deterrence Theory, within the context of 
utility theory and the simple model of rational crime, will help to guide the study design, 
development of the research instrument, and explanation of results. 
There are three principles in the General Deterrence Theory.  They are celerity, 
severity, and certainty.  The celerity is the frequency of punishment.
31
  Evidence has 
shown that increased in actual audits reduce noncompliance rates. (Alm et al., 1992; 
Bloomquist, 2009; Fischer et al., 1992; Hasseldine et al., 2007; Joulfaian & Rider, 1998).  
Severity is the magnitude of the punishment.  Studies have shown that imposing penalties 
of 900 percent will deter individuals from becoming noncompliant (Morris, 2010).  
Certainty is the perceived probability of detection.  Please keep in mind that, depending 
on selection criteria, the current IRS probability of detection is between 1 and 10 percent 
(Johns & Slemrod, 2010; Joulfaian & Rider, 1998).  Rasholnikov (2006) suggested that 
decisions to evade are based on perceived probability of detection.  As the literature on 
audits explained (Alm et al., 2004; Clark et al., 2004; Collins & Plumlee, 1991), higher 
perceived audit rate yield higher compliance. 
Even though General Deterrence Theory is partially based on utility theory, it is 
also derived from Exchange Theory, which is often used in sociology (Grasmick & 
Green, 1980).  This theory has been predominantly used in the fields of political science 
and criminology, but has seen wide use in information systems security and economics as 
well.   
In the field of political science, General Deterrence Theory applies to the use of 
military threats, normally in terms of nuclear threat, to deter other global players from 
engaging in armed confrontation (Quackenbush, 2011a).  More broadly, the theory assist 
                                                 
31
 Celerity is not within the scope of these studies.  
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political scientist in understanding the resolution and de-escalation of different 
international and interstate conflicts (Zagare, 2007) 
With respect to information systems, General Deterrence Theory is used to 
identify the antecedents that lead to system risks.  Straub and Welke (1998) identified 
four areas that minimize “system risks” (pg. 441).  They classified these areas as 
deterrence, prevention, detection, and recovery.  Willison and Warkentin (2013) define 
these areas as: 
Deterrence is the attempt to preclude unwanted behavior through incentives or 
disincentives. 
Prevention is any effort used to preclude the commission of a crime.  
Detection is the identification of committed antisocial actions.   
Remedy (or recovery) refers to methods or strategies developed to block future 
commission of crimes. 
Of the four areas identified above, deterrence and prevention are the best way to 
decrease noncompliance (Willison & Warkentin, 2013).  Using these areas to minimize 
risks within an IT setting, an enforcement compliance cycle was constructed to illustrate 
where deterrence would apply to the tax noncompliance context.   
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Figure 3 depicts the tax enforcement compliance cycle based on Willison and 
Warkentin (2013) and the extended security action cycle of Straub and Welke (1998). 
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Figure 3: Enforcement Compliance Cycle 
 
As the figure shows, deterrence occurs after an individual has interacted with the 
authority and has formed an opinion about the system.  The idea behind implementing a 
deterrence strategy is to curtail the motivation to engage in antisocial behaviors.  This 
process repeats itself every time when taxes are filed and paid. 
With respect to criminology, General Deterrence Theory explains the use of 
punishment as a method to control antisocial or criminal behavior.  This strategy is in line 
with the strategy proposed by the current IRS commissioner Koskinen, which relies on 
providing strong disincentives for taxpayers to comply with the code (Koskinen, 2015). 
For example, the IRS uses different deterrence methods for those who do not comply.  
Possibly the most common methods currently in use are penalties and interests (P&I).  
Depending on the violation committed, the severity of those penalties and interest could 
increase and can reach up 100 percent of the amount owed (IRS, 2013; Morris, 2010).  In 
addition, there are costs associated to undergoing an audit and these increase the net cost 
of noncompliance and lead to improved compliance regardless of audit outcome.  
Noncompliant taxpayers can also incur interest on penalties, which further increases the 
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cost of punishment.  These and other deterrence tools, including imprisonment (which is 
considered to be incapacitation or specific deterrence), encompass the arsenal available to 
the IRS in deterring individuals from becoming noncompliant. 
The notion of deterrence is broadly accepted and the literature explicates 
individuals’ embarrassment of apprehension (Gordon, 1989; Grasmick & Green, 1980) 
and “moral commitment to the law” (pg. 325) (Grasmick & Green, 1980) as being 
motives for compliant behavior.  Embarrassment and commitment combined with the 
possibility of monetary and criminal punishment can coalesce to reduce antisocial 
behavior.  In this study, the criminal or antisocial behavior is the deliberate or accidental 
tax payment noncompliance and much of the compliance literature argues the benefits of 
deterrence in curbing these antisocial acts.  
The model below, derived from Apel (2013) and Grasmick and Green (1980) 
perceptual deterrence model, provides a visualization of how punishment deters 
individuals’ antisocial behavior.  In order to apply this model to employment tax 
compliance some relevant modifications had to be made, but the model gives a mental 
picture of how the current study will proceed to research the issues being raised. 
The model shows how punishment, through sanctions, subjective norms, and 
normative beliefs, impact a taxpayer’s perceived probability of detection, and how that 
change in perception further impacts compliance levels.  The model is split into two 
general areas: the aggregate and the individual levels.  The first construct is prescribed 
punishment.  This is nothing more than the laws that govern then enforcement of tax 
noncompliance.  The second column constructs are the general public’s observation and 
perception of punishment.  In essence, it is the perception the average taxpayer has once 
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he/she acquires second hand experience of the punishment received by lawbreakers or the 
interaction they have with other people in their lives. 
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Figure 4: Deterrence Model 
 
The next construct is perceived probability of detection.  This construct 
distinguishes the aggregate-level from the individual-level.  This construct is nothing 
more than the perceived audit rate, which most taxpayers perceive it to be higher than the 
actual rate (Alm et al., 1992; Scholz, 2003; Schulz, 2014).  In this study, the introduction 
of a safe harbor provision will explicitly alter the probability of detection for one group.  
Therefore, it is expected that at the individual-level there will be an improved compliance 
once the provision is chosen.  The next column reflects whether the taxpayer was selected 
for an audit.  These two objects are dependent on whether or not the individual is 
compliant (the last set of constructs in the flowchart). 
Now that an explanation of how General Deterrence Theory fits this research, a 
more in-depth discussion will investigate the three principles of General Deterrence 
Theory – celerity, severity, and certainty. 
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V.2.2 Principles of General Deterrence Theory 
V.2.2.1 Celerity 
Celerity is how quickly an individual receives punishment after committing a 
crime.  To put it in a quotidian context, celerity is the time it takes for a parent to 
castigate a child after disobeying.  The consensus is that the faster the punishment is 
enacted (especially with small children and pets), the more effective is the deterrence. In 
terms of the General Deterrence Theory, it is the imminence of punishment.  Nagin and 
Pogarsky (2001) propose that celerity, unlike severity and certainty, does not deter 
antisocial behaviors.  The argument is that sensible adults, unlike children and pets, do 
understand the connections between delayed consequences of punishment and the 
associated antisocial behavior.  In other words for deterrence to work, immediate 
punishment is not required.    
In this study, the effects of celerity are not being studied.  However, its effects 
could be studied by charging penalties and interest at different time intervals (e.g., 6, 9, 
12 months) after an audit identifies noncompliance. 
V.2.2.2 Severity 
The Oxford Dictionary defines severity as the fact or condition of being strict or 
harsh (Oxford_Dictionaries, 2015). Within General Deterrence Theory, severity of 
punishment is one of the biggest factor that influence the commission of antisocial 
behavior (Grasmick & Green, 1980).  According to Apel (2013), the severity of 
punishment is the first principle that must be established in order to create deterrence.  
The severity of an offence is determined by the law.  The assessed punishments are 
“remedies” for offending.  Turk et al. (2007) explain that individuals’ filing behaviors are 
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altered once a penalty and interests are imposed and Morris (2010) says that the 
magnitude of the punishment has an impact on filing compliance. 
This principle has been measured in prior experiments using three methods.  The 
first is to indicate what the law prescribes.  The second method is for participants to 
select the penalty they are most likely to receive.  Lastly, participants would estimate the 
probability of a penalty given an offence committed. 
In the case of employment tax, severity of punishment includes all the different 
deterrence tools the IRS currently has at its disposal and these are prescribed by the code.  
However, a duly authorized individual, as defined by the code, cannot avoid personal 
liability from these taxes.  In other words, even when the firm dissolves, the employment 
tax liabilities do not dissolve, but are simply transferred to duly authorized individuals.  
This transfer of employment tax liabilities is an additional punishment of the duly 
authorized individuals for failing to pay employment taxes.   
For the purpose of this study, punishments assessed will also be prescribed as in 
the tax code.  Because the code dictates punishment and there is no expected change on 
the horizon, there will be no adjustment to the severity of punishment as specified in the 
code. 
V.2.2.3 Certainty 
Certainty references the degree of certainty or a probability that an eventuality 
will occur (as in the certainty of getting caught cheating on taxes).  In other words, it is 
the likelihood that an event will take place, given prior information about this event.  
Within the scope of this research, certainty is the risk of detection (Apel, 2013). Within 
the tax literature, this is defined as the probability of detection or audit.  Within General 
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Deterrence Theory, severity of punishment is the other biggest factor influencing 
antisocial behavior (Grasmick & Green, 1980), but, according to Nagin and Pogarsky 
(2001), it is the most influential factor in deterring antisocial behaviors. 
This principle simply expresses the notion that the higher the degree of certainty 
of being detected, the less likely an individual is to commit an antisocial act.  Currently, 
the probability of an audit is very low in the US.  However, the probability of an audit for 
employment tax is extremely high.   
Federal Tax Deposit (FTD) Alerts, which identify employment tax payment 
noncompliance, are done on a quarterly basis.  This alerts are based on a systematically 
review of employment tax payment over one year.  Given the systematic review, 
employers are more likely to be audited by the IRS.  Apel (2013) concluded that when an 
individual experiences a form of punishment (e.g., an audit), this experience will have an 
impact on the perceived certainty of punishment.   
V.3 Research Model 
The research model provided in this study is based on the Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972).  As stated above, their original model was: 
                                  (1) 
Where E(U) is the expected utility; p is the probability of detection (or audit)
32
; W 
is income; X is reported income; Θ is the tax rate; and π is the penalty rate.  If W is 
greater than X, there is a tax gap.  Simply, the right side of the equation provided a 
formula of the gains                and the cost                  
associated with the final reporting decision.  As mentioned above, and using formula, 
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 Since the probability of automated/computerized audit is close 100 percent for employment tax, the 
enforcement rate will be used to develop a more accurate constructs experienced by taxpayers. 
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when the probability of detection (p) or penalty (Θ) increases, reporting improves 
because the cost increases beyond the gains from underreporting.  This same model could 
be restated as a multistage model using the following equations:  
                           (2) 
Where    are the gains over t-time and    is the cost associated with being 
discovered during that same period.  By introducing a safe harbor provision, the 
probability of detection is zero (0); therefore, penalties would also be zero.  On the other 
hand X would equal W, and the new equation for those how choose the safe harbor 
provision will be: 
              (1a) 
              (2a) 
It is important to remember that for those who do not choose the safe harbor 
provision, Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model would still apply.   
The model below, derived from Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, provides a 
visualization of how the certainty of punishment deters individuals’ antisocial behavior, 
holding celerity and severity constant. 
 
Degree Pay 
Compliance 
Certainty of 
Punishment 
(Probability of 
detection) 
Safe Harbor 
Severity of 
Punishment 
Celerity of 
Punishment 
Enforcement - 
No Enforcement 
 
Figure 5: Research Model 
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VI LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION  
Taxpayer compliance can be sub categorized into three groups: payment, filling, 
and reporting compliance (Brown & Mazur, 2003).  Of these sub categories, this study 
will focus on payment compliance.  While there has been a plethora of reporting and 
filing compliance research, the same cannot be said about payment compliance (relative 
to the other two sub categories).  The main reason for focusing on payment compliance is 
that the majority of employment tax noncompliance arises from payment noncompliance.  
This is a direct result of high level of information matching from a third source, which 
makes it easy to detect filing and reporting noncompliance.  As the literature has shown, 
noncompliance occurs where transaction visibility decreases. 
The practical motivation of this study is to better understand this compliance sub 
category and market segment, which account for $72 billion of the tax gap.  Furthermore, 
the Service has indicated an interest in improving voluntary compliance of employment 
tax, and this research study could provide some insights on how to collaborate with this 
important market segment in an epoch of diminishing budgets. 
The theoretical motivation of this study is to enhance our understanding of 
taxpayers’ antisocial behavior using General Deterred Theory.  Deterrence is the impact 
punishment has on those who have not committed an antisocial act (i.e., the externality of 
punishment).  In terms of tax enforcement, deterrence is the impact tax audits and 
consequential punishments have on those individuals who have failed to meet their tax 
requirements.   
The General Deterrence Theory provides explanation as to how difference levels 
of punishment influence antisocial behavior.  Its economic foundation is based on 
optimization of expected utility, which is one of the most common theories used to 
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explain tax compliance behavior.  In general, the measurement deterrence can be 
achieved by calculating the change in criminal rate at different levels punishments 
(Blumstein et al., 1978).  This study will test the change in payment behavior when 
different levels of certainty (i.e., probability of detection) are imposed 
The research question is whether different tax regimes change the payment of 
employment tax behavior for small business or self-employed taxpayers.  The idea is to 
determine if a safe harbor provision can reduce the proclivity of authorized individuals to 
implement a payroll tax dilemma strategy and whether or it can reduce payment 
noncompliance in time of economic distress (i.e., income shock). 
The experiment will follow a similar design to Alm et al. (1992).  Subjects will be 
able to earn income.  In addition, subjects will have a set number of employees who will 
work a set number of hours at a set wage price.  Using this information, subjects will 
voluntarily report and pay employment taxes.  Once filing and payment of employment 
tax is completed, subjects will be subject to a random enforcement.  If underreporting 
and/or underpayment are detected during enforcement, the subject will be instructed to 
pay the owed amount plus a 100 percent penalty on the amount owed (as prescribed by 
the code).  After several rounds, individuals will be asked to participate in a safe harbor 
program.  After several rounds under a safe harbor provision, an income shock (i.e., 
lower revenues) will be introduced to test the viability of an employment tax safe harbor 
provision. 
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VII HYPOTHESES 
From the prior literature and theory development sections, there are four 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Business owners with higher tax liability thresholds will subscribe to a 
safe harbor provision at a lower rate than business owners with the lower tax liability 
thresholds. 
Hypothesis 2a: Business owners who experience enforcement will have higher 
subscription rate to a safe harbor provision than those who do not experience 
enforcement. 
Hypothesis 2b: Business owners who have experienced enforcements
33
 will have higher 
compliance rates than those who do not experience enforcement. 
Hypothesis 3: Business owners who chose the safe harbor provision will be more 
compliant, with respect to payment. 
Hypothesis 4: Business owners who chose the safe harbor provision will remain more 
compliant after an income shock
34
 is experienced. 
  
                                                 
33
 In this study, experiencing enforcements means undergoing an audit. 
34
 Income shock is defined as a 50 percent drop in firm revenue 
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VIII METHODS 
Many of the models created over the past several decades have allowed 
researchers to advance our learning about taxpayer behavior.  Of those methods used to 
acquire understanding, experimental design appears to be well suited to identify and 
explain the discrepancies and inconsistencies associated with the economic models.  This 
method allows researchers “control over extraneous influences” (pg. 107) (Alm, 1991). 
The experiment followed a similar design to Alm et al. (1992), using scenarios to 
examine options and make choices in the laboratory setting with the hope of mimicking a 
real life scenario.  To achieve this, subjects were able to earn money.  However, the 
subjects were not able to make it based on how well they performed throughout the 
experiment because of the delivery method and IRB constraints, as originally prescribed.  
In addition, subjects were informed of important information about labor (e.g., number of 
employees, number of worked hours, employee wages).  Using this information, subjects 
were asked to voluntarily report and pay employment taxes.  Once filing and payment of 
employment tax was completed, participants were subject to a random enforcement.
35
  If 
underreporting and/or underpayment are detected during enforcement, the subject was 
informed of audit results (change/no change), and if applicable, was instructed to pay the 
amount owed as prescribed by the code.  After several rounds, subjects were asked if they 
wish to participate in a safe harbor program.  After several rounds under a safe harbor 
provision, an income shock (i.e., lower business revenues) was introduced to test the 
viability of an employment tax safe harbor provision. 
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 Since the conditional audit strategy for employment tax enforcement is unknown, a simple random 
enforcement rate will be used. 
 62 
It is important to know that this study did not attempt to identify different modes 
of compliance amongst taxpayers.  The interest of this study was focused on detection of 
payment noncompliance and to potentially identify ways to encourage taxpayers to 
voluntarily comply.  In addition, this study was trying to determine if a safe harbor could 
reduce the taxpayer burden, which accounts for $100 billion dollars per year in 
deadweight loss to the economy. 
VIII.1 Experimental Design 
To answer the research question, an experiment
36
 was employed to examine 
business owners’ behavior when making employment tax payments.  The experimental 
design was an impact study.  An impact study measures the effects of enforcement and/or 
the safe harbor provision on the subjects partaking in the experiment.  This method has 
been selected because it tends to have strong internal and conclusion validity 
(Bhattacherjee, 2012; Fischer et al., 1992; Trochim & Donnelly, 2007c).  This type of 
experiment would only have strong external validity if the study took place in its normal 
environment, as in a field experiment.  Some realism is enacted by having the subjects 
are real world business people and this enhances external validity even in a lab 
experiment. 
VIII.1.1 Validity 
As mentioned earlier, the method utilized in this study was selected because it 
tends to have strong internal, external and conclusion validity.  Internal validity 
indicates whether observable changes to compliance are in fact affected by the 
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 In an ideal setting, this study would be “field” experiment by randomly selecting actual business owners 
from know IRS data sources.  It would not use students in a lab nor would it use a purposive sampling.  The 
business owners would follow the lab experiment, and they would be randomly selected. 
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introduction of a safe harbor provision.  To ensure internal validity, Bhattacherjee (2012) 
suggest meeting three conditions – covariation of cause and effect, temporal precedence, 
and no plausible alternative explanation.  By meeting these conditions, the experiment is 
able to manipulate the independent variables through treatments and observe its effects 
on the dependent variable and control for extraneous variables.  To do so, random 
assignment was used.  By utilizing random assignment, it is expected that this limitation 
is diminished and external validity is improved (Heinsman & Shadish, 1996; Ong-Dean, 
Huie Hofstetter, & Strick, 2011; Shadish, Clark, & Steiner, 2008). In this process, two 
groups were created in which subjects with similar employment tax characteristics had 
the same probability of assignment and neither study administrators nor subjects had the 
capability of choosing which group they are assigned.   
External validity indicates whether observable changes can be generalized to the 
population.  The easiest way to achieve external validity is to draw a random sample from 
the population.  Although the targeted population is known for a given point in time, this 
information is not easily accessible.  Therefore, the finding will be based on the group of 
subject that participated in this experiment. 
VIII.1.2 Experiment  
For the pretest, eight known associates completed the study.  Subjects were 
recruited from the Georgia State University EDB student and alumni body and known 
associates from the accounting field (e.g., CPAs) and business owners.   These 
individuals first completed the experiment.  Then, they were asked a few open-ended 
questions about the flow of the experiment, and the content to minimize 
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misunderstanding by future subjects about employment tax, the safe harbor provision, 
and Form 94X. 
Themes did materialize with the initial interviews about the information provided 
in the balance sheet (Appendix A).  Minor changes were made to provide some relevant 
information pre-test subjects thought were necessary to make informed decisions.  Before 
the web experiment went live, a Qualtrics team evaluated the experiment’s logic flow to 
ensure proper random assignments throughout the experiment. 
The other step is the experiment.  In this step, subjects were randomly assigned 
into one of two groups (high tax liability threshold and low tax liability threshold).  There 
were 105 subjects randomly assigned to low tax liability threshold and 100 subjects 
randomly assign to high tax liability threshold for a total of 205 subjects. 
For subjects to continue their participation in the experiment, they had to agree to 
the informed consent, and selected that they reside in the United States.  They also had to 
identify if they ever had any personal involvement with the employment tax process by 
doing any of following:  
 Filed employment taxes with state or federal agencies 
 Made employment taxes payments to state or federal agencies 
 Supervised the filing or payment of employment taxes to the state or federal 
agencies  
 Assisted a business with the filing or payment of employment taxes to the state or 
federal agencies 
This question satisfied experiment criteria: (1) Has the recruit filed employment 
taxes or paid employment taxes in the last year and/or (2) Has the recruit supervised the 
filing of employment tax or supervised the payment of employment taxes in the last year? 
Once the subject has decided to participate and fulfilled the informed consent and 
the criteria requirements, he/she would be able to complete the web-based test.  Before 
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random assignment, the test requires subjects to responding to a series of questions to 
assess their perception of audit, misreporting, and penalties. 
After that, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups: high or low tax 
liability thresholds.  Research has shown that individuals with higher tax liability 
threshold exhibit higher risk seeking behaviors, and individuals with lower tax liability 
threshold exhibit risk adverse behaviors (Robben et al., 1990)  and these results are 
expected to be exhibited in this study.  After random assignment, all subjects had to 
complete a practice round, which required subjects to respond to a battery of questions.  
These questions were intended to create a realistic scenario with respect to filing and 
payment of employment tax.  Questions mimicked the filing and payment of a simple 
IRS Form 940.  The intention of a simplified Form 940 was to minimize confusion and 
boredom.  
Since the literature has indicated that tax decisions evolve using information 
obtained over the course of several years, this process of responding to the battery of 
questions was repeated six more times.  This was done to follow the recommendations 
provided by Alm (1991), which recommends utilizing several rounds to enhance the 
sense of realism.  With that said, Alm (1991) does suggest that lab experiments are 
unable to perfectly replicate real life compliance decisions that can be influenced by 
normative beliefs and subjective norms.  Although this study was intended to simulate six 
employment tax filing and payment cycles, subjects were told that there are an unknown 
number of rounds in this experiment. 
It is expected one of the most important pieces of information an individual will 
continuously assess is the probability of an audit.  As the literature showed, this 
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probability will shift depending on whether or not the individual was audited after 
underreporting and inevitably underpaying (Andreoni et al., 1998; Turk et al., 2007).  
Since the probability of audit (at least automated audit) is approximately 100 percent for 
employment tax, the enforcement rate will be used to develop the construct experienced 
by taxpayers.  The enforcement rate indicates to taxpayer when the tax authorities 
physically (or through a letter) interact with taxpayers. 
During the experiment, subjects had the opportunity receive income and pay taxes 
for their firm.  In addition, individual had the opportunity to report (or underreport) their 
employment tax liability and tax payment.  If enforcement was undertaken and subjects 
were found to have underreported employment tax, penalties were imposed.   No 
enforcement took place in the first round, but all other rounds were subject to a random 
enforcement.  The experiment is divided into four phases: random assignment, random 
assignment with enforcement, self-assignment, and income shock.  The first phase 
consisted of one round and it provided the baseline measure.  The second and third 
phases consist of two rounds each.  The last phase consists of one round.  Figure 6 
illustrates the round process (see Section 8.3 for more details).  After the third round was 
completed, individuals had the option to accept or reject a safe harbor provision.  A safe 
harbor provision specifies conditions that protect individuals or firms from being deemed 
in violation of the Internal Revenue Code and subject to an IRS audit.  Examples of the 
safe harbor rules are 401(k) rule, W-2 wages rule, telecommunication conversion of 
capitalized assets under §263(a), and electric transmission and distribution property under 
§263(a) or §162.  The following two rounds will provide the control parameters for the 
safe harbor provision. 
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Figure 6: Test Phase Process 
 
Once subjects have completed five rounds of employment tax filing and payment 
simulations, subjects completed one additional round in which they were exposed to an 
income shock (intervention).  This intervention was to determine if subjects fell into the 
payroll tax dilemma under a safe harbor provision, and to see whether the provision 
minimizes the discrepancy between taxes paid and taxed owed for those who subscribe to 
it.
37
 Secondly, the intervention allowed the investigator to test the differences between 
those taxpayers who have large and low tax liability. 
VIII.1.3 Social Desirability Bias 
Social desirability bias is associated with individuals participating in surveys.  In 
essence, individuals try to respond to questions in a manner that satisfies the proctor of 
the survey or respond to questions in a socially desirable way – “fake good or fake bad” 
(pg. 394) (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  Krumpal (2013) suggest that the individual is 
engaging in the self-preservation of his/her image.  Social desirability bias tends to occur 
                                                 
37
 The discrepancy will be defined and the “willingness to pay” in the Data Analysis section of the 
prospectus 
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in areas of personal or social discomfort, such as, personal weight, voting, taxes, drug 
use, and sexual preference (Gittelman et al., 2015; Myung-Soo, Nelson, & Kiecker, 
1997).  This bias tends to magnify the end of the scale responses (e.g. very satisfied) 
(Myung-Soo et al., 1997).  It becomes necessary to guard against social desirability bias 
because of its impact of survey responses and because this experiment engages on a 
socially sensitive issue – taxes.  
Some of the research studies have shown that social desirability bias takes two 
forms: individuals characteristics and survey characteristics (Krumpal, 2013).  Since the 
investigator was able to test for individual characteristics, investigator focused on 
improvising the survey characterizes in order to reduce social desirability bias.  One 
method that has shown to reduce the social desirability bias is through use of indirect 
(Fisher, 1993) and direct questions (Myung-Soo et al., 1997).  The difference between 
indirect and direct questions is that indirect questions ask the subject to project on other 
people versus making statements about him/her.  The idea of asking both we check for 
social desirability bias while maintaining measurement validity. 
Another method for reducing social desirability bias is to portrait some 
conjectural distance to the tasks in the study.  For example, the instructions in the 
experiment could tell the subject that they are a contractor for a small business or a 
typical small business owner.  In both cases, the instructions are setting the subject to 
think in a certain manner.  This method was used in this experiment. 
Burton-Jones (2009) also explains that social desirability measurement can be 
distorted from three sources: raters, instrument, and process.  The rater error could be 
minimized by  clearly defining the rater (Burton-Jones, 2009).  For this experiment, the 
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rater was a duly authorized individual of a small business.  For this experiment, the raters 
were asked, “to play the role of the typical small business owner with several fulltime 
employees.” 
VIII.1.4 Probability of Detection or Enforcement 
The IRS audits selection is not random (IRS, 2006) and it is probability is not 
constant (Andreoni et al., 1998).  As the literature shows, the IRS audit strategies are 
similar to conditional or strategic audit rule used to determine the probability of detection 
and appear to be the best plausible option available for the authorities, in term of 
maximizing compliance.  Although the actual audit rate for employment tax is unknown 
to the public, the IRS audit levels of employment tax can be expected to be relatively 
high
38
 and does have a high level of third party reporting.  Most of the third party 
matching is completed automatically and only those automated audits that appear to have 
irregularities are more closely examined and experience enforcement.   
The examinations that require closer review are the type examinations taxpayers 
associate as undergoing an enforcement action.  Since taxpayers do not experience any 
form of automated audit unless selected for further examination, enforcement rate will be 
used when discussing employment tax audit.  Enforcement rate is a better construct for 
this experiment since taxpayers are more likely to experience the enforcement process 
than the audits.    
Given audit rates are high and the expected enforcement rate also relatively high 
for the remaining identified taxpayers, a 50 percent random enforcement regime was used 
in this experiment.  The  
                                                 
38
 The employment tax deposits are analyzed for payment compliance in all businesses that have a weekly 
and semiweekly deposit requirement.  This analysis is tantamount to an audit and it constituted a large 
portion of employers. 
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Table 2 shows the expected probability of enforcement for the random assignment 
section using a 50 percent random enforcement selection criterion over three rounds. 
Table 2: Enforcement Probability for the Random Assignment Section 
 1st Rounds 2nd Rounds 3rd Rounds Probability 
2 Enforcements No Enforcement Enforcement Enforcement 25% 
One Enforcement No Enforcement No Enforcement Enforcement 25% 
One Enforcement No Enforcement Enforcement No Enforcement 25% 
No Enforcement No Enforcement No Enforcement No Enforcement 25% 
 
The  for enforcements. 
Table 3 below provided the probability of enforcement for the self-assigned safe 
harbor section using a 50 percent random enforcement selection criterion for 
enforcements. 
Table 3: Enforcement Probability for the Self-Assignment Section 
 Probability 
Two  Enforcement 25% 
One Enforcement 50% 
No Enforcement 25% 
 
The Table 4 below provides the expected probability of enforcement for the entire 
experiment.  However, a sizable number of subjects subscribed to the safe harbor 
provision, and the probability decreased substantially for two to five enforcements and 
the probability of no enforcement increased.  Further information is provided in the 
Findings section. 
Table 4: Enforcement Probability for the Experiment 
 Probability 
Four Enforcements 15.6% 
Three Enforcements 31.3% 
Two  Enforcement 31.3% 
One Enforcement 15.6% 
No Enforcement 6.2% 
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VIII.1.5 Tax Liability Thresholds Selection – the Tax Rate 
The tax liability threshold selection was derived using the suggestions of prior 
research on income threshold selection.  In some studies, researchers have suggested 
using thresholds of total gross receipts greater $25,000 or total gross receipts greater than 
$100,000, including Erard (2002).  To understand the reasoning, analysis of different 
individual and business tax data were conducted.  The IRS 2003 SOI Data “Table 2: 
Selected financial data on businesses” data showed approximately 25.4 small businesses 
existed during that point in time (including approximately 3.3 million small 
corporations).  Of the 25.4 small business 60.7 percent of them made less than $25,000 in 
total gross receipts and had an average tax liability of $160, and 81.2 percent of them 
made less than $100,000 in total gross receipts with an average tax liability of $168. 
Although this information is useful in identifying characteristics of smaller 
business, such as their general earnings potential and business tax owed, it does not 
provide any indication of employment tax liability, but total gross receipts thresholds.  To 
obtain a proxy of employment tax liability some calculations were made using different 
IRS data tables.  IRS 2013 “Table 1.1 All Returns: Selected Income and Tax Items, by 
Size and Accumulated,” shows an average adjusted gross income of $61,700 and an 
average individual income tax liability of $13,065.  Using the aggregate data and the 
employment tax rates, an average in trust amount was calculated and it is approximately 
$22,500.
39
  From this amount, employers owe an average of approximately $4,700 for 
each employee.  Using this information, a definition of high and low tax liability 
threshold was defined.  This amount would be the same as the imposed tax rate.  The 
                                                 
39
 The estimations were calculated using income data.  Income data is positively skewed, so it safe to 
assume that the median amounts are lower than the average amounts provided.  Nevertheless, they provide 
an approximation of thresholds. 
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lower employment tax rate required employers to pay $2,500 per employee and the high 
require a payment of $6,750 per employee.  Hence, the lower tax liability threshold pays 
a lower tax rate than individuals assigned to the high tax liability threshold. 
VIII.1.6 Population of Interest and Sampling Design 
The population of interest in this study was all authorized individuals from small 
and self-employed firms.  A duly authorized individual is defined as individuals or 
officers who oversee the collection, accounting, and payment of employment tax (IRS, 
2013).  This could be restated as someone who is personally liable for the payment of 
employment tax withholdings deposits even after the firm becomes insolvent. 
Although the population of this study is well defined, the sampling frame for this 
study was not accessible.  Because of this limitation, the sampling design was a purposive 
sampling.  This sampling technique was used to ensure that subjects undertaking this 
experiment meet the described criteria.  
Using a non-probability sampling technique will most likely lead to invalid 
confidence intervals and sampling errors (Alreck & Settle, 1995), and it does not allow 
researchers to make inferences about the population.  However to overcome this 
limitation, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups using a table of random 
numbers.  By randomly assigning subjects into one of the two groups, a randomize 
experiment was created and internal validity was ascertained (Trochim & Donnelly, 
2007b).  Internal validity allows researchers to establish causal relationship between 
dependent and independent variables. 
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VIII.1.7 Sample size 
The sample size of this study is based on the a-priori sample size calculation for 
analysis of variance (ANOVA).  The sample size calculation was computed using 
G*power.  A-priori sample size calculation is use to reduce type II error.  Using this 
calculation, the minimum sample size to obtain a power of 0.83 is 16 observations per 
cell.  The larger the sample size for each cell will lead to smaller standard errors and 
larger power.  The sample size anticipated for this study is 200 subjects.  This allows for 
approximately 50 observations per cell, which result in a statically power of over 0.95.  
Given that the safe harbor provision is self-assigned, it possible that cells size may differ. 
VIII.1.8 Unit of Observation and Unit of Analysis 
The research design collected data at the individual taxpayer level.  Therefore, the 
unit of observation was small business self-employed taxpayers who filed or paid 
employment tax in prior years.  Since study was identifying behavioral differences 
between those who subscribed and those who did not subscribe to a safe harbor 
provision, the unit of analysis was also small business self-employed taxpayers. 
VIII.1.9 Implementing the Penalties and Interest 
The code provides two ways to calculate civil tax penalties for tax evasion: fixed 
dollar amount or fixed percentage (Rasholnikov, 2006).  The idea for fixed dollar amount 
is to signal certainty and to remove any ambiguity as to the dollar amount of the assessed 
penalty and interest. In general, this amount increases depending on the severity of the 
violation.  Fix dollar amounts are more likely to be used with violations that are more 
serious.  The fixed percent is a fix percent of underreported amount.  As with fixed dollar 
amount, the percentage imposed is dependent on the severity of the infraction.  For 
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example, employment tax has a recovery penalty of 100 percent while penalty for 
negligent understatements is 20 percent.
40
 
In addition, the fix penalty amount is useful in cases where the amount owed can 
be significantly different.  To illustrate, suppose you have to small business owners.  One 
owes $10,000 and the other owes $1 million. It would be draconian to change $50,000 to 
the one owing $10,000 and a mere slap on the wrist for the one owing $1 million.  Given 
the potential variation in noncompliance amounts, using fix percentage for 
underreporting amounts maintains a fair and equitable treatment of all individuals before 
the law.   Since fix percentage is dictated by Publication 15, this research study will do 
the same.  The mandated percentage is 100 percent. 
VIII.1.10 Safe Harbor and Self-Assignment 
In this study, subjects were instructed to decide whether to participate in a safe 
harbor program.  Under met conditions, a safe harbor provision will minimize taxpayers’ 
legal responsibilities and should reduce the cost of compliance.  In this study, subjects 
will self-assign their participation in the safe harbor provision by simply checking a box.  
This decision will take place after several rounds of the experiment.  By the time subjects 
were confronted with this decision, approximately half of all subjects would have been 
selected and experienced enforcement.  Furthermore, for those who had experienced 
enforcement, many of them were informed that enforcement had taken place and sanction 
(i.e., penalties and interest) were assess.    
As the literature has suggested, the audit rate will have impact on the compliance 
rate, and for employment tax this rate is relatively high.  Rasholnikov (2006) also 
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 § 6662(a)–(b)(1) 
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suggested that taxpayers will voluntarily report their filing violations if the sanctions 
imposed by tax authorities fall below their expectations.  He also proposed that taxpayers 
would voluntarily comply with their tax obligations if their expected penalties were equal 
or greater to those imposed by the authorities.  Furthermore, Alm (1991) suggested that 
amnesty will increase compliance in the short-run. 
Two examples that illustrate these concepts are Voluntary Worker Classification 
Settlement Program and the 2012 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program.  In both of 
these programs, the IRS lowered the penalties to improve voluntary compliance.  The 
Voluntary Worker Classification Settlement Program allowed employers, who are not 
currently being audited, to reclassify their workers and make minimal payments on prior 
tax obligations without having to pay penalties or interest.  The 2012 Offshore Voluntary 
Disclosure Program allowed taxpayers who have undisclosed offshore income to report 
their income by a given due date to reduce their penalties and eliminate their chances of a 
criminal prosecution.  In this two examples illustrate how Rasholnikov (2006) suggestion 
apply. 
From our knowledge of taxpayer behavior, it can be concluded that taxpayers who 
face high audit or enforcement rate and the possibility of reduced penalties are more 
likely to subscribe to a safe harbor provision.  Kalambokidis et al. (2012) illustrated that 
individuals were willing to pay a fee for a burden reduction.  In addition, it can be 
concluded that individuals who are not compliant but expectations of penalties are higher 
than those associated with a safe harbor provision are also expected to subscribe to the 
provision.  Therefore, it is expected that only those who are not compliant and have lower 
expectation of sanctions will not subscribe to the safe harbor provision. 
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VIII.2 Data Analysis 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was chosen as the data analysis technique.  
ANOVA is beneficial because it allows for the violation of equal cell variances and 
differences in-group means (Lindman, 1970).  In this study design, subjects were 
randomly assigned into either low or high tax liability threshold groups.  This groups are 
defined by the amount owed to the tax authorizes at the end of each round.  The benefit 
of random assigned is that investigators can assume probabilistic equivalence (Trochim 
& Donnelly, 2007a).  Therefore, ANOVA is be able assess the casual relationship 
between the two independent variables (tax rate, enforcement regime, safe harbor 
provision, and income shock) and the dependent variables compliance by measuring the 
mean differences amongst groups.   Furthermore, ANOVA is an appropriate tool for 
analyzing binary data (Lunney, 1970), and it was used in this study.  Since the data 
allowed, regression modeling was used to identify the safe harbor subscription drivers 
and the employment tax payment compliance drivers.  
VIII.3 Test Phase  
This study was split into four phases. In all phases, subjects’ firm was able to earn 
income and had a set number of employees who worked a set number of hours at a set 
wage price.   Subjects were also informed that enforcement was going to be conducted 
thought the experiment.  On the other hand, subjects were not informed as to the 
probability of audit or enforcement.  Using this information subjects voluntarily reported 
and paid employment taxes.  Compliance was measured at the completion of each round.  
Phase 1 consist of randomly assigning subjects to a group.  Phase 2 introduces 
enforcement regime.  Phase 3 introduces the safe harbor provision.  Phase 4 introduces 
 77 
income shock.  The following sections will provide additional information to the 
mechanic and data obtained in each phase.  A general layout of all rounds is provided in 
Figure 6: Test Phase Process. 
VIII.3.1 Phase 1 
Phase 1 set out to answer the first hypothesis of this study.  To do so, subjects 
were randomly assigned to a group – denoted by R.  The random assignment was 
determined by high or low tax liability threshold, which are denoted as subscripts H and 
L respectively.  The lower employment tax liability threshold was set at $2,500 and the 
high was set at $6,750 per employee.  
The O denotes the measured outcome, and it is the difference between reported 
amount and actual amounts reported and paid.  For this phase/round, it identifies the 
baseline measure for the experiment.  Figure 7 provides a visual assessment of the two 
rounds within Phase 1.  This round is a 2X0, and it will be used as a control group for all 
analysis. 
 
RH1 
RL1 
O1 
O1 
Figure 7: Phase 1 Random Assignment Design. 
 
Once subjects were assigned to a group, subjects remained in that group for the 
remainder of the experiment. 
VIII.3.2 Phase 2 
Phase 2 consisted of two rounds, and it sets out to answer hypotheses 2a and 2b.  
As in Phase I, subjects’ firm earned income and it had a set number of employees who 
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will work a set number of hours at a set wage price, which was used to voluntarily report 
and pay employment taxes. 
Unlike Phase 1, subjects were subject to a random enforcement (please see 
Section 6.1.4 for more details on the probability of enforcement).   The subject was 
subsequently informed of the audit results.  If underreporting and/or underpayment were 
detected during the enforcement process, the subject were instructed to pay the owed 
amount plus a 100 percent penalty on the amount owed as prescribed by the code.   
Figure 8 provides a visual assessment of the two rounds within Phase 2.  The 
letter R denotes random assignment and subscript H and L denote high and low tax 
liability thresholds.  The number under each letter identifies rounds.  For example, round 
2 high tax liability threshold random assignments is denoted as RH2.  The X is 
enforcement treatment.  The measure outcomes – O – was difference between reported 
and paid amount and actual reported and paid amounts.  The opportunity to earn income 
is based on the scenario of the experiment (see Appendix A). 
 
X2 
O2 
O2 
O2 
O2 
RH2 
RL2 
RH2 
RL2 
X2 
Round 2 Round 3 
X3 
O3 
O3 
O3 
O3 
RH3 
RL3 
RH3 
RL3 
X3 
Phase 2 
Figure 8: Phase 2 Random Assignment Design. 
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VIII.3.3 Phase 3 
Phase 3 consists of two rounds, and it set out to answer hypothesis 3.  To answer 
the hypothesis, Phase 3 introduced into the decision process the safe harbor provision 
under the same enforcement regime.  As with prior phases, subjects undertook the same 
tasks to voluntarily reporting and paying of employment taxes.  
Subjects received a random enforcement treatment, but only if they did not 
subscribe to the safe harbor provision at the end of Phase 2 and adhered to requirements.  
If underreporting and/or underpayment were detected during the enforcement process, the 
subjects were instructed to pay the owed amount plus a 100 percent penalty on the 
amount owed as prescribed by the code. 
Figure 9 provides a visual assessment of the two rounds within Phase 3.  As in 
Phase 2, the letter R denotes random assignment and subscript H and L denote high and 
low tax liability thresholds.  The number under each letter identifies rounds.  The C 
denotes individuals in who subscribed to the safe harbor provision, which uses a cutoff 
score.  The X implies the enforcement treatment.  The O is measured outcomes. 
 
Figure 9: Phase 3 Randomize Design with a Cutoff 
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VIII.3.4 Phase 4 
Phase 4 consists of one round, and it sets out to answer hypothesis 4 by 
introducing an income shock.  This manipulation will allow testing difference between all 
prior treatments.  As with prior phases, subjects were able to earn income and had set 
number of employees who worked a set number of hours at a set wage price, which can 
be used to voluntarily report and pay employment taxes. 
In this phase, subjects were not subject to a random enforcement.  It is expected 
that with and income shock some of the subjects may not adhere to the safe harbor 
provision, and may undertake noncompliant behavior (Please see Findings section for 
details).  Once this section was completed, the phase portion of the study ended.   
VIII.4 Measuring Risk Appetite  
To control for risk appetite in the selection of the safe harbor provision and 
potential control for compliance behaviors, a risk attitude scale was constructed.  This 
scale is based on Joost and Smidts (2000) and Lampenius and Zickar (2005).  The 
questions were asked to all subjects, and the questions were staggered between 
speculative risk and risk control.  These questions are provided on Table 5. 
The data will be analyzed for reliability using scale analysis (Cronbach's alpha), 
which is the central measurement of internal consistency.  To analyze validity of the risk 
appetite construct, factor analysis was used.  Although factor analysis is not primarily 
used for validity, the results in the component metric and orthogonal rotational matrix 
could be robust indicator of validity.  Given these questions have been used in prior 
studies, it is expected that the Cronbach’s alpha results will yield acceptable internal 
consistencies (α > 0.7 (Nunnally, 1994)).  Furthermore, it is expected that the variable 
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should load into two distinct groups (Speculative Risk and Risk control), validating the 
construct.  (Please see Finding section for results)  
Table 5: Risk Construct 
Risk Questions Scales 
Speculative 
Risk 
I see risk as an opportunity to make money 
Agree-
Disagree 
I like taking big financial risks 
Agree-
Disagree 
I get a thrill out of investing 
Agree-
Disagree 
When I complete my taxes forms I am willing to make aggressive reporting 
activities 
Agree-
Disagree 
Risk 
Control 
When I invest money a safe return is very important to me 
Agree-
Disagree 
When I invest I plan on having a specific amount at a future date 
Agree-
Disagree 
It is important to know with how much money my investment will provide 
me in the future 
Agree-
Disagree 
I consult a tax adviser when completing my taxes 
Agree-
Disagree 
I pro-actively manage tax filing process with the aim of minimizing risk of 
enforcement 
Agree-
Disagree 
 
In addition, there were questions on perception of the probability of enforcement 
and the penalty rate.  These questions are provided in   
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Table 6.  These particular questions on the probability of enforcement were 
requested at the start and the end of the experiment.  The table below provides the 
questions provided at the end of the experiment.  The penalty rate was only asked at the 
end of the experiment to determine change in perception to audit and penalty to 
employment tax payment.  
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Table 6: Enforcement, Timing and Penalty Questions 
 Questions Scales 
Probability of 
Enforcement 
From your interaction with the IRS, what do you think is the 
likelihood of employment tax enforcement?  (please provide a 
percent) 
Percent 
If you miss report on your employment tax filling, what do you 
think is the likelihood that IRS will question the amount reported? 
(please provide a percent) 
 
Percent 
After completing this experiment, what do you think was the 
enforcement rate for this experiment? (please provide a percent) 
Percent 
Penalty Rate 
If caught and successfully prosecuted, what do you think the 
employment tax penalties would be? (please provide a percent) 
Percent 
After completing this experiment, what do you think was the 
penalty for failure to pay employment tax? (please provide a 
percent) 
Percent 
Timing 
If I am caught and successfully prosecuted, how much time do you 
think it would take the IRS to prosecute? 
Open ended 
(rating scale) 
 
VIII.5 Additional Test Details 
VIII.5.1 Recruitment 
The source for recruitment pre-test was investigator-initiated in-person contact 
and emails.  The recruitment script has been developed to ensure consistent screening and 
to provide potential subject the ability to opt-out of the research study.  In addition, a 
handout was developed with pertinent information for those individual who accept and 
qualify to be subjects.  Some of the information provided includes study web page and 
the expected duration of study.  An email script has been attached.  Online recruitment 
for the test portion of the experiment was done using Qualtrics’ assistance. 
VIII.5.2 Funding and Compensation 
All the compensation was monetary.  The funding source for this study was the 
student PI’s own personal income.  The student PI did not receive any grants or 
sponsorship of any kind.  The student PI paid Qualtrics for each participant, and Qualtrics 
compensated subjects five dollars for their participation as approved by the IRB.  This 
payment system was easy, fast, and free for those receiving moneys.  This payment 
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process diverged from the Google Wallet, but I permitted subjects to receive payment 
without the need to create a Google Wallet account.  Furthermore, without the student 
PI’s knowledge, Qualtrics also compensated the participants an additional $4 from the 
student PI’s payment to Qualtrics.  This payment means that all participants received a 
flat fee of $9 regardless of treatment/answers for participating in the study. 
VIII.6 Deviations from Original Design 
This subsection discusses the deviation from the proposed methods identified in 
Section 8 of this document. 
Although ANOVA analysis was conducted as prescribed by the measures section, 
additional nonparametric statistics were ran for each round of the experiment.  The 
Pearson’s χ2 was used for categorical variables while the Fisher Exact test was used for 
binary variables.  These different nonparametric tests were used because they are more 
appropriate for the data obtained in this experiment.  Nevertheless, the ANOVA analysis 
and the non-parametric test yielded similar results and both were used in the discussion of 
our findings. 
Another deviation from the methods section was payment to subjects.  The 
prescribed payment for participating in this experiment was five dollars paid using 
Google wallet.  However, Qualtrics directly paid the subjects and Google wallet was not 
used in the payment.  In addition, participants were paid nine dollars instead of five. 
A third deviation was the number of subject who participated.  The original 
method section indicated that 15 subjects were to participate in the pre-test.  However, 
only eight subjects participated in the pre-test.   For the test, 200 subjects were to 
complete the experiment.  However, the way Qualtrics cutoff the participation, it led to 
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an additional five subjects to participate.  The total number of participants was intended 
to be 215, but ultimately 213 participated.  No pre-test participants were included in the 
analysis of the results since changes were made. 
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IX FINDINGS 
IX.1 General Demographics of Subjects 
The data below shows how subjects who participated in the study are involved in 
the employment tax process.  The results are provided on Table 7.  Approximately 40 
percent of participants had been involved in the filing and or payment process in a single 
capacity, with “Employee” accounting for over 50 percent of those.  At the other 
extreme, 6.8 percent of participants were involved in the process in all capacities. 
Table 7: Involvement with Employment Tax Filing and Payment Process 
 
Frequency Percent 
Accountant 8 3.9 
Lawyer 1 0.5 
Business Owner 21 10.2 
Manager 7 3.4 
Employee 45 22.0 
All Capacities 14 6.8 
Two Involvement Capacities 54 26.3 
Three Involvement Capacities 33 16.1 
Four Involvement Capacities 15 7.3 
Other 7 3.4 
Total 205 100 
 
Of those who chose “Two Involvement Capacities,” they selected employee 66.7 
percent of the time, and managers 59.3 percent of the time.  All other options were 
selected less that 50 percent of the time. 
Of those who had chosen “Three Involvement Capacities,” they selected 
employee 90.9 percent of the time, managers 87.9 percent of the time, business owner 
63.6 percent of the time and Accountant 51.5 percent of the time.  All other options were 
selected less that 50 percent of the time. 
 87 
Of those who had chosen “Four Involvement Capacities,” they selected 
accountant 100 percent of the time, manager 93.3 percent of the time, and business owner 
86.7 percent of the time.  All other options were selected less that 50 percent of the time. 
Table 8 shows the geographical breakdown of participants.  Although this information 
cannot be used to infer to the population of interest, that is, all small business owners and 
tax managers, it shows that participation came from throughout the United States and it 
was not concentrated in one particular area in the US.  Therefore, we believe that the 
sampling is reasonable and will provide interesting observations even though it is not, 
strictly speaking, and a random sample. 
Table 8: Geographical Breakdown of Participating Subjects 
 
Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Alabama 3 1.5 Mississippi 3 1.5 
Arizona 6 2.9 Missouri 2 1 
California 15 7.3 Nevada 3 1.5 
Colorado 5 2.4 New Jersey 6 2.9 
Connecticut 2 1 New York 14 6.8 
Delaware 2 1 North Carolina 5 2.4 
Florida 25 12.2 Ohio 8 3.9 
Georgia 12 5.9 Oklahoma 3 1.5 
Hawai'i 1 0.5 Oregon 4 2 
Illinois 9 4.4 Pennsylvania 15 7.3 
Indiana 4 2 Rhode Island 1 0.5 
Iowa 1 0.5 South Carolina 2 1 
Kansas 1 0.5 South Dakota 1 0.5 
Kentucky 6 2.9 Tennessee 7 3.4 
Maryland 3 1.5 Texas 11 5.4 
Massachusetts 4 2 Vermont 1 0.5 
Michigan 7 3.4 Virginia 3 1.5 
Minnesota 2 1 Wisconsin 4 2 
 
IX.2 Risk Appetite Analysis and Enforcement Perception 
To control for risk appetite in the selection of the safe harbor provision and 
potential control for compliance behaviors, a risk attitude scale was constructed.  The 
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data was analyzed for reliability using scale analysis, which is the key statistic for of 
reliability.  To analyze the construct validity of the risk appetite construct, factor analysis 
was used.   
IX.2.1 Reliability 
Using questions derived from prior studies, a scale for risk was created and was 
tested to control for risk appetite in the selection of the safe harbor provision and 
potential control for compliance behaviors.  Table 9 shows the results for the Cronbach’s 
alpha tests.  The results in this study yielded acceptable internal consistencies (α > 0.7 
(Nunnally, 1994)), and Cronbach’s alpha and the Tukey analysis show no difference 
between items.  Therefore, the analyses rely on high level of internal consistency in the 
measures. 
 Table 9: Cronbach’s Alpha Results 
Risk type Cronbach’s alpha Number of items 
Speculative control 0.776 4 
Risk control  0.765 5 
 
IX.2.2 Validity 
Table 10 shows the results for construct validity testing for both risk components 
(Speculative Risk and Risk control).  These results were obtained using principal 
component methods and Varimax rotation.  As the table shows, the variables of interest 
loaded into two distinct components providing evidence that the components are 
construct-valid. Variable loading below 0.4 were suppressed to easily identify the loading 
factors (Hair, 1998, 2014).   
One of the variables, “I get a thrill out of investing,” loaded into both 
components.  However, it has a 0.466 loading score, which indicates a weaker measure 
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for risk control.  Nevertheless because of its score, this variable will be kept in both 
components.  The total variance explained using this model was 58.8 percent. 
Table 10: Factor Analysis for Risk 
  Components 
 Risk 
Control 
Speculative 
Risk 
I see risk as an opportunity to make money. 
 
0.827 
When I invest money, a safe return is very important to me. 0.770 
 
I like to take big financial risks. 
 
0.887 
When I invest, I plan on having a specific amount at a future date. 0.763 
 
I get a thrill out of investing. 0.466 0.629 
It is important to know how much money my investment will provide 
me in the future. 
0.769 
 
I consult a tax advice when completing my taxes. 0.539 
 
When completing my taxes, I am willing to make aggressive reporting 
activities.  
0.661 
I proactively manage the tax filing process with the aim of minimizing 
risk of audit. 
0.726 
 
 
Additional tests were run to ensure sampling adequacy was suitable for the test.  
KMO statistics provide analysis on variance and it provides guidance on the usefulness of 
factor analysis.  In essence, it tests whether or not the sample is sufficient given the 
number of variables used in the factor analysis conducted.  Results should be greater than 
0.70 for factor analysis to be useful (Kaiser, 1974; Stewart, 1981).  The KMO result was 
0.736 indicating that the data structure is adequate. 
The Bartlett's test of sphericity checks to see if the correlation matrix is an 
identity matrix.  The presence of an identify matrix implies no correlation between the 
variables used in the factor analysis conducted.  Since there has to be some relationship 
between the variables used to construct a component, an identify matrix would not be 
suitable for factor analysis.  For suitable results, a number below 0.05 is expected (IBM, 
2017; Stewart, 1981).  In this case, the expected value was below 0.05 (a statistic of 
0.000).  Consequently, our data is suitable and our components are valid.  Predictive 
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analyses using these results are located in Section Logistic Regression Control 
Compliance 
IX.2.3 Probability of Enforcement and Penalty Rate 
IX.2.3.1 Changes to Probability of Enforcement 
The average perceived pre-test audit rate was 40.3 percent, and the post-test 
results showed a 74.9 percent perceived audit rate.  This is a 34.9 percent increase.  To 
determine whether the pre-test audit rate had an impact on the post-test audit rate, a one-
way ANOVA was run using a 5 percent alpha protection level.  The results showed that 
there was no statistical difference (p-value = 0.113) between perceived pre and post-test 
audit rate.  The results indicate that the pre-test audit rate (independent variable) had no 
substantial affected the post-test audit rates (dependent variable). 
IX.2.3.2 Changes to Penalty Rate 
The average perceived pre-test penalty rate was 262.0 percent, and the post-test 
results showed a 92.9 percent perceived audit rate.  This was a 169.1 percent decrease, in 
absolute terms.  This information implies that payment compliance is improved once the 
safe harbor provision became available to subjects.  To determine if there was a statistical 
difference in the subjects’ perception of the audit rate, a one-way ANOVA was also run 
using the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  The results showed that 
there was no statistical difference (p-value = 0.805) between perceived pre and post-test 
rate of audit rate indicating that compliance did not increase.   Although the reduction in 
penalty rate seemed large, the insignificant results from the ANOVA could be in part 
attributed to the large standard deviation within the data (142.2 and 48.7 percent 
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respectively).  Given the results, additional logistic regression analyses were conducted.  
Those results are found in Section IX.3.6.  
IX.3 Hypothesis testing 
From the prior literature and theory development sections, there are four 
hypotheses tested.  There are three possible outcomes: accepted, rejected, and partial 
acceptance.  Accepted indicates that all the results indicate that the hypothesis is 
supported.  Rejected indicates that all the results indicate that the hypothesis is not 
supported.  Partial acceptance indicates that some of the results do support the 
hypothesis, but not all them.   
Table 11: Results by Hypothesis 
Null Hypothesis Supported? 
Hypothesis 1: Business owners within the higher tax liability thresholds will have lower 
subscription to a safe harbor provision than business owners within the lower tax liability 
thresholds. 
Partial 
Acceptance  
Hypothesis 2a: Business owners who experience enforcement will have higher 
subscription rate to a safe harbor provision than those who do not experience 
enforcement. 
Accepted 
Hypothesis 2b: Business owners who experience enforcements will have higher 
payment compliance rate than those who do not experience enforcement. 
Rejected 
Hypothesis 3: Business owners who chose the safe harbor provision will be more 
compliant, with respect to payment. 
Partial 
Acceptance 
Hypothesis 4: Business owners who chose the safe harbor provision will remain more 
compliant after an income shock is experienced. 
Partial 
Acceptance 
 
The next four subsections provide the results for each hypothesis test.  The results 
to all the hypotheses are presented in  
Table 11.  The alpha protection levels for all results in the finding sections are 
0.05. 
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IX.3.1 Hypothesis 1 
The hypothesis 1 states that, “Business owners within the higher tax liability 
thresholds will have lower subscription to a safe harbor provision than business owners 
within the lower tax liability thresholds.”  The tests in this subsection will identify if there 
is any statistical differences in the subscription rate between business owners randomly 
assigned to high and low tax liability thresholds.  The dependent variable for Hypothesis 
1 is Subscription rate and the independent variable is tax liability thresholds. 
                (3) 
where SR is the subscription rate to safe harbor provision and 
LT (subscript) is the binary tax liability thresholds (low or high), 
Formula 3 states that the subscription rate is expected to be greater for subjects 
with low liability than for those subjects having higher tax liability thresholds.  
As the results show on  
Table 12, the subscription rate for the voluntary safe harbor participation was 
large.  The subscription rate dropped consistently from one round to the next for the high 
tax threshold subjects, but it fluctuated for the low tax liability threshold.  Nevertheless, 
both high and low experienced an overall drop of roughly 10 percent (8.4 percent and 
10.5 percent respectively). 
Table 12: Safe Harbor Subscription Rate by Tax Liability Thresholds  
 Low High 
End of Round 3 Subscription Rate 94.3%  (99/105) 90.0%  (90/100) 
End of Round 4 Subscription Rate 96.2%  (101/105) 87.0%  (87/100) 
End of Round 5 Subscription Rate 86.7%  (91/105) 81.0%  (81/100) 
 
The next four subsections focus on each round of non-parametric test results and 
the ANOVA test.   
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IX.3.1.1 Round 4 Test Results 
Figure 10: Round 4 Distributions of the Safe Harbor Provision Subscription Rate 
Given Figure 10 shows the distribution of subscription to the safe harbor provision given 
their employment tax liability threshold (Low versus High).  As the picture shows, a 
larger number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision.  However, the 
figure shows slightly higher subscription rate to the safe harbor provision for those 
subjects who were randomly assigned to the lower tax liability threshold than those 
subjects who were randomly assigned to the higher tax liability threshold.  The statistical 
tests for significance are shown below. 
 
Figure 10: Round 4 Distributions of the Safe Harbor Provision Subscription Rate 
Given Employment Tax Liability Threshold 
 
To determine the relationship between tax liability threshold and subscript on to a 
safe harbor provision in the fourth round, two similar nonparametric tests were used
41
: 
the Fisher Exact test and the Pearson’s Chi-Square (χ2).  The Fisher Exact test is a χ2 that 
examines the relationship between the two dimensions.  This test results are found on 
Table 13.  The hypothesis is: 
                                                 
41
 Both test were run because there was a low number participants who were audited because of the high 
level of safe harbor provision subscription.  The non-parametric tests were better fit for this scenario than 
ANOVA.  
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Ho: The tax liability threshold and safe harbor provision are independent in the 4
th
 
round. 
Ha: The tax liability threshold and safe harbor provision are not independent in the 
4
th
 round. 
The Fisher Exact test p-value is 0.189, so the null hypothesis was not rejected.   
These results confirm that there is no association between tax liability threshold 
and subscription to safe harbor provision.  This conclusion is further collaborated by the 
Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.253), which shows that we can accept the null hypothesis and 
conclude that compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision are not related at 
the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  The results confirm higher tax 
liability thresholds may not lead to higher subscription to safe harbor provision the fourth 
round. 
Table 13: Hypothesis 1 Round 4 Statistical Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. p-
value (2-
sided) 
Exact p-
value (2-
sided) 
Exact p-
value (1-
sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 1.307 
a
 1 0.253   
Continuity Correction 
b
 0.780 1 0.377   
Likelihood Ratio 1.317 1 0.251   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.303 0.189 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.301 1 0.254   
 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is 7.80. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Furthermore,   
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Table 14 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  The results 
found an η of 0.080 and an η2 of 0.006.  Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio, 
2008), the results show a small effect size between compliance and subscription to the 
safe harbor provision.  This implies that the employment tax liability threshold had a 
small effect on subscription rate in the fourth round.  These results are in line with the Phi 
and Cramer’s V test results, which show a small effect.  However, since the results were 
not statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can 
only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8.  In 
this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.19.  Therefore, we cannot 
generalize these results to the population. 
  
 96 
Table 14: Hypothesis 1 Round 4 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.080 - 
Phi -0.080 0.253 
Cramer’s V 0.080 0.253 
 
IX.3.1.2 Round 5 Test Results 
 
Figure 11 shows the distribution of subscription to the safe harbor provision given 
their employment tax liability threshold (Low versus High).  As the picture shows, the 
results are similar to those in round 4.  There were a larger number of subscriptions to the 
safe harbor provision and higher subscription rate for subjects assigned lower tax liability 
threshold than those subjects assigned to the higher tax liability threshold than with the 
other two rounds observed.  The statistical tests for significance are shown below. 
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Figure 11: Round 5 Distributions of the Safe Harbor Provision Subscription Rate 
given Employment Tax Liability Threshold 
    
To determine the relationship between the tax liability threshold and subscription 
to a safe harbor provision in the fifth round, the same two nonparametric tests were used 
(Fisher Exact Test and Pearson’s χ2).  The hypothesis is provided below and results are 
provided on Table 15.   
Ho: The tax liability threshold and safe harbor provision are independent in the 
5th round. 
Ha: The tax liability threshold and safe harbor provision are not independent in the 
5
th
 round. 
The Fisher Exact test p-value was 0.015.  From this result, the null hypothesis is 
rejected, confirming that there is association between the tax liability threshold and 
subscription to a safe harbor provision in the fifth round.  These results confirm that low 
tax liability thresholds subjects subscribed to the safe harbor in higher statistical numbers 
by high liability threshold subjects.  This conclusion is further collaborated by the 
Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.017), which shows that we can reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that tax liability threshold and subscription to the safe harbor provision are 
related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level in the fifth round .  
The results confirm higher tax liability thresholds may lead to higher subscription to safe 
harbor provision the fifth round. 
Table 15: Hypothesis 1 Round 5 Statistical Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. p-
value (2-
sided) 
Exact p-
value (2-
sided) 
Exact p-
value (1-
sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 5.689 
a
 1 0.017   
Continuity Correction 
b
 4.544 1 0.033   
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Likelihood Ratio 5.938 1 0.015   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.022 0.015 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
5.661 1 0.017 
  
 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is 8.29. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Furthermore, Table 16 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  
The results found an η of 0.167 and an η2 of 0.027.  Using Cohen’s interpretation 
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results showed a very small effect size between 
employment tax liability threshold and subscription to the safe harbor provision.  This 
implies that the employment tax liability threshold had a small effect on the safe harbor 
provision subscription rate during the fifth round.  These results are in line with the Phi 
and Cramer’s V test results, which are statically significant at the community-standard 5 
percent alpha protection level. 
Table 16: Hypothesis 1 Round 5 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.167 - 
Phi -0.167 0.017 
Cramer’s V 0.167 0.017 
IX.3.1.3 Round 6 Test Results 
Figure 12 shows the distribution of subscription to the safe harbor provision given 
their employment tax liability threshold (Low versus High).  As the picture shows, the 
results are similar to rounds 4 and 5.  However, there is a lower subscription rate for this 
round that the other rounds (in absolute terms), and a larger jump in the low tax liability 
threshold.  The statistical tests for significance are shown below. 
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Figure 12: Round 6 Distributions of the Safe Harbor Provision Subscription Rate 
given Employment Tax Liability Threshold. 
 
To determine the relationship between tax liability threshold and subscript on to 
safe harbor provision in the sixth round, the same two nonparametric tests were used 
(Fisher Exact Test and Pearson’s χ2).  The hypothesis is provided below and results are 
provided on Table 17.   
Ho: The tax liability threshold and subscription to safe harbor provision are 
independent in the 6th round.  
Ha: The tax liability threshold and subscription to safe harbor provision are not 
independent in the 6th round. 
The Fisher Exact test p-value is 0.181, so the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
These results confirm there is no association between tax liability threshold and 
subscription to safe harbor provision.  This conclusion is further collaborated by the 
Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.270), which shows that we can accept the null hypothesis and 
conclude that compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision are not related at 
the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  The results confirm higher tax 
liability thresholds may not lead to higher subscription to safe harbor provision the sixth 
round. 
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Table 17: Hypothesis 1 Round 6 Statistical Tests 
 
Value df 
Asymp. p-
value (2-
sided) 
Exact p-
value (2-
sided) 
Exact p-
value (1-
sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 1.218 
a
 1 0.270   
Continuity Correction 
b
 0.834 1 0.361   
Likelihood Ratio 1.220 1 0.269   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.342 0.181 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.212 1 0.271   
 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is 16.10. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Furthermore, Table 18 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  
The results found an η of 0.077 and an η2 of 0.006.  Using Cohen’s interpretation 
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a very small effect size between compliance 
and subscription to the safe harbor provision.  These results are also in line with the Phi 
and Cramer’s V test results.  The results would imply payment compliance had a small 
effect on the safe harbor subscription rate the sixth round.  However, since the results 
were not statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, 
we can only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 
0.8.  In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.20.  Therefore, we 
cannot generalize these results to the population. 
Table 18: Hypothesis 1 Round 6 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.077 - 
Phi -0.077 0.270 
Cramer’s V 0.077 0.270 
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IX.3.1.4 Hypothesis 1 ANOVA Test Results 
An ANOVA test was also run as indicated in the methods section.  The ANOVA 
test evaluates the mean difference between employment tax liability threshold and 
subscription to the safe harbor provision.  Table 19 shows the results of the test.  The p-
value results for rounds 4 and 6 were greater than 0.05, but they were less than 0.05 for 
round 5.  Thus, the results confirm no dependency between the safe harbor subscription 
rate and the liability threshold subjects (high or low) for the fourth and sixth round.  
However, there was a mean difference in the safe harbor subscription rate between high 
and low tax liability threshold subjects in the fifth round, which confirm dependency 
between the safe harbor subscription rate and the liability threshold subjects (high or low) 
in the fifth round. 
 
Table 19: Hypothesis 1 ANOVA tests for  
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Round 4  0.094 1 0.094 1.303 0.255 
Round 5 0.433 1 0.043 5.794 0.017 
Round 6 0.005 1 0.005 0.021 0.884 
 
IX.3.2 Hypothesis 2a 
Hypothesis 2a sets out to determine whether Business owners who experience 
enforcement will have higher subscription rate to a safe harbor provision than those who 
do not experience enforcement.  This section is also segmented into four areas of results 
based on each round of tests and ANOVA analysis. 
The tests in this subsection will identify if there is any statistical differences in the 
subscription rate and the number of enforcement treatments.  The dependent variable for 
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Hypothesis 2a is once more the subscription rate, but the independent variable is the 
number of enforcement treatments under gone during the experiment.   
               (4) 
where SR is the safe harbor subscription rate and 
ET is the number of enforcement treatments. 
Formula 4 states that the subscription rate is expected to improve as subject 
encounter higher levels of enforcement.  
Table 20 shows the distribution of enforcement treatments during the experiment 
and a comparison to the expected enforcement rate calculated prior to the experiment.  
The percent shown in this table can be used as the probability of enforcement as 
described in Section 8.1.5 (page 45).  The table shows a higher number of not selected 
and “1 enforcement encounter” than previously expected.  This shows that participants 
subscribed to the safe harbor provision at a higher rate than anticipated in the design. 
Table 20: Enforcement Treatments Frequency and Percent 
Number of Enforcement 
Treatments 
Frequency Probability 
Expected 
Probability 
No treatment 49 23.9% 15.6% 
1 treatment 96 46.8% 31.3% 
2 treatments 56 27.3% 31.3% 
3 treatments 4 2.0% 15.6% 
4 treatments 0 0% 6.2% 
 
IX.3.2.1 Round 4 Test Results 
Figure 13 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to the safe 
harbor provision given the number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments).  As 
the picture shows, a larger number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision.  
The figure also shows similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not 
subscribed), and a high number of subscriptions to the safe harbor provision for those 
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who experienced the higher enforcement treatments.  The statistical tests for significance 
are shown below. 
 
Figure 13: Round 4 Distributions between Enforcements Treatments and the Safe 
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate. 
   
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and subscription to a safe 
harbor provision in the fourth round, a Pearson’s χ2 was run.  Since the dependent 
variable is categorical and not binary, the Fisher Exact test was not run for this 
hypothesis.  The results are shown on  
Table 21.  
Ho: Safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are 
independent in the fourth round.  
Ha: Safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are not 
independent in the fourth round. 
A Pearson’s χ2 was run and the p-value was 0.012, which shows that we can reject 
the null hypothesis confirming that there is association between enforcement treatments 
and subscription to the safe harbor provision.  This confirms that enforcement treatments 
and subscription to the safe harbor provision are related at the community-standard 5 
percent alpha protection level.  These results confirm that a higher number of 
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enforcement treatments may lead to higher subscription to the safe harbor provision in 
the fourth round. 
Table 21: Hypothesis 2a Round 4 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df 
Asymp. p-value 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 10.913 a 3 0.012 
Likelihood Ratio 6.182 3 0.103 
Linear-by-Linear Association 2.690 1 0.101 
 
a. 4 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is .31 
As with the prior hypothesis, an effect size test was conducted. Table 22 shows 
the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  The results found an η of 0.231 and an 
η2 of 0.053.  Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a 
small effect size between enforcement treatments and subscription to the safe harbor 
provision.  This implies that the enforcement treatments had a small effect on the safe 
harbor provision subscription rates the fourth round.  These results are in line with the Phi 
and Cramer’s V test results, which are statically significant at the community-standard 5 
percent alpha protection level.   
Table 22: Hypothesis 2a Round 4 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.231 - 
Phi 0.231 0.012 
Cramer’s V 0.231 0.012 
 
IX.3.2.2 Round 5 Test Results 
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Figure 14 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to a safe harbor 
provision given the number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments).  The results 
in this round are similar to those in round 4 and 6.  Some of the similarities are larger 
number of participants who subscribed to the safe harbor provision, and similar 
distributions for within groups (subscribed and not subscribed).  However, in this round, 
those individuals who experienced more than 3 enforcement treatments did not overly 
subscribe to the safe harbor provision, which contradicts expectations.  The statistical 
tests for significance are shown below. 
 
Figure 14: Round 5 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and the Safe 
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate. 
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To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and subscription to a safe 
harbor provision in the fifth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run, and results are show on 
Table 23.  
Ho: The safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are 
independent in the fifth round.  
Ha: The safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are 
not independent in the fifth round. 
As mentioned before, The Fisher Exact test was not run.  On the other hand, the 
Pearson’s χ2 was run and the p-value was 0.000, which shows that we must reject the null 
hypothesis confirming that there is association between enforcement treatments and 
subscription to the safe harbor provision.  This confirms that enforcement treatments and 
subscription to the safe harbor provision are related at the community-standard 5 percent 
alpha protection level.  The results confirm that a higher number of enforcement 
treatments may lead to higher subscription to the safe harbor provision in the fifth round. 
Table 23: Hypothesis 2a Round 5 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df 
Asymp. p-value 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 47.167 a 3 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 23.497 3 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.981 1 0.026 
a. 4 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is .33 
Furthermore, Table 24 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  
The results found an η of 0.480 and an η2 of 0.230.  Using Cohen’s interpretation 
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a moderate effect size between enforcement 
treatments and subscription to the safe harbor provision.  This implies that the 
enforcement treatments had a moderate effect on safe harbor subscription rates the fifth 
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round.  These results are in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results, which are 
statically significant at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level. 
Table 24: Hypothesis 2a Round 5 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.480 - 
Phi 0.480 0.000 
Cramer’s V 0.480 0.000 
 
IX.3.2.3 Round 6 Test Results 
Figure 15 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to a safe harbor 
provision given the number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments).  The results 
in this round are similar to those in round 4 and 5: 
 Larger number of them subscribed to the safe harbor provision 
 Similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not subscribed).  The 
statistical tests for significance are shown below. 
 Higher subscription to the safe harbor provision for those who experienced higher 
enforcement treatments. 
 
Figure 15: Round 6 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and the Safe 
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate. 
   
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and subscription to a safe 
harbor provision in the sixth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run and the results are shown on 
Table 25.  
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Ho: The safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are 
independent in the sixth round.  
Ha: The safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement treatments are 
not independent in the sixth round. 
As mentioned before, the dependent variable is not a binary variable and the 
Fisher Exact test was not run.  The results from the Pearson’s χ2 found a p-value was 
0.009 in the sixth round, which shows that we can reject the null hypothesis confirming 
that there is association between enforcement treatments and subscription to the safe 
harbor provision.  This confirms that enforcement treatments and subscription to the safe 
harbor provision are related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  
The results confirm that a higher the number of enforcement treatments may lead to 
higher subscription to the safe harbor provision in the sixth round. 
Table 25: Hypothesis 2a Round 6 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df 
Asymp. p-value (2-
sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 11.680 a 3 0.009 
Likelihood Ratio 8.367 3 0.039 
Linear-by-Linear Association 4.529 1 0.033 
 
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is .64 
Furthermore, Table 26 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  
The results found an η of 0.239 and an η2 of 0.057.  Using Cohen’s interpretation 
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a small effect size between enforcement 
treatments and subscription to the safe harbor provision.  This implies that the 
enforcement treatments had a small effect on the safe harbor subscription rates in the 
sixth round.  These results are in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results, which are 
statically significant at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  
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Although the results were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community 
protection level, we can only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the 
statistical power is above 0.8.  In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 
0.94.  Therefore, we can generalize these results to the population. 
Table 26: Hypothesis 2a Round 6 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.239 - 
Phi 0.239 0.009 
Cramer’s V 0.239 0.009 
 
IX.3.2.4 Hypothesis 2a ANOVA Test Results 
An ANOVA test was run as planned in the proposal.  The ANOVA test evaluates 
the mean difference between the safe harbor subscription rate and number of enforcement 
treatments.   
Table 27 shows, all the p-values were below the community-standard 5 percent 
alpha protection level.  The results confirm a dependency between the safe harbor 
subscription rate and the number of enforcement treatments (i.e., 1- 4).  Since the number 
of enforcements had an impact on the safe harbor subscription rate, this corroborates with 
the idea that subjects with higher enforcement treatments would be more likely to 
subscribe to the safe harbor provision. 
Table 27: Hypothesis 2a ANOVA tests 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Round 4  0.785 3 0.262 3.767 0.012 
Round 5 3.587 3 1.196 20.022 0.000 
Round 6 1.577 3 0.526 4.048 0.008 
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IX.3.3 Hypothesis 2b 
Hypothesis 2b sets out to determine whether business owners who experience 
enforcement will have higher payment compliance rate than those who do not experience 
enforcement.  This section is also segmented into four areas of results based on each 
round of tests and ANOVA analysis. 
The tests in this subsection will identify if there is any statistical differences in the 
employment tax payment compliance and the number of enforcement treatments.  The 
dependent variable for Hypothesis 2b is employment tax payment compliance, and the 
independent variable is the number of enforcement treatments undergone during the 
experiment.   
 
                  (5) 
Where PMT is employment tax payment compliance category 
EE is the number of enforcement treatments 
Formula 5 states that the employment tax payment compliance category is 
expected to improve as subject encounter higher levels of enforcement.  Employment tax 
payment compliance category is a binary variable and it was calculated in two steps.  
First, the difference between expected payment and actual payment was calculated.  
Using the results from this step, a binary variable was compute suing the following 
formula: 
If Actual payment – Expected payment ≥ 0 → Compliant  
If Actual payment – Expected payment < 0 → Non-Compliant 
These computations were used for every round and throughout all analysis of 
payment compliance. 
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IX.3.3.1 Round 4 Test Results 
Figure 16 shows the distribution of subjects’ propensity to comply given the 
number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments).  As the picture shows, a larger 
number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision.  The figure also shows 
similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not subscribed), but the figure 
shows a higher rate of payment compliance for those who experience an enforcement 
encounter.  The statistical tests for significance are shown below. 
 
Figure 16: Round 4 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and Payment 
Compliance Rate. 
   
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and payment compliance in 
the fourth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run.  Since the dependent variable is categorical 
and not binary, the Fisher Exact test was not run for this hypothesis.   
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are 
independent in the fourth round. 
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are not 
independent in the fourth round. 
The results are shown on Table 28.  The Pearson’s χ2 was run and the p-value was 
0.075, which shows that we can accept the null hypothesis confirming that there is no 
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association between enforcement treatments and employment tax payment compliance.  
This confirms that enforcement treatments and employment tax payment compliance are 
not related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  The results 
confirm that a higher the number of enforcement treatments may not lead to higher 
payment compliance in the fourth round. 
Table 28: Hypothesis 2b Round 4 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df 
Asymp. p-value 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 6.918 a 3 0.075 
Likelihood Ratio 6.878 3 0.076 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.297 1 0.585 
 
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is 1.58 
As with the prior hypothesis, an effect size test was conducted. Table 29 shows 
the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  The results found an η of 0.184 and an 
η2 of 0.033.  Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a 
small effect size between enforcement treatments and payment compliance.  These results 
are also in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results.  The results would imply 
enforcement treatments had a small effect on payment compliance rate the fourth round.  
However, since the results were not statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific 
community protection level, we can only generalize these effect sizes to the population if 
the statistical power is above 0.8.  In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power 
was 0.76.  Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the population. 
Table 29: Hypothesis 2b Round 4 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.184 - 
Phi 0. 184 0.075 
Cramer’s V 0. 184 0.075 
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IX.3.3.2 Round 5 Test Results 
Figure 17 shows the distribution of subjects’ propensity to comply given the 
number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments).  As the picture shows, a larger 
number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision.  The figure also shows 
similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not subscribed). Unlike the previous 
round, the figure shows a similar rate of payment compliance given the number of 
enforcement treatments.  The statistical tests for significance are shown below. 
 
Figure 17: Round 5 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and Payment 
Compliance Rate. 
   
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and payment compliance in 
the fifth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run and the results are shown on Table 30.  Since the 
dependent variable is categorical and not binary, the Fisher Exact test was not run. 
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are 
independent in the fifth round. 
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are not 
independent in the fifth round. 
The Pearson’s χ2 was run and the p-value was 0.437, which shows that we can 
accept the null hypothesis confirming that there is no association between enforcement 
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treatments and employment tax payment compliance.   This confirms that enforcement 
treatments and payment compliance are not related at the community-standard 5 percent 
alpha protection level.  The results confirm that a higher the number of enforcement 
treatments may not lead to higher payment compliance in the fifth round. 
 
Table 30: Hypothesis 2b Round 5 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df 
Asymp. p-value 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 2.720 a 3 0.437 
Likelihood Ratio 2.686 3 0.443 
Linear-by-Linear Association .600 1 0.439 
 
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is 1.56 
Table 31 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  The results 
found an η of 0.115 and an η2 of 0.013.  Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio, 
2008), the results show a small effect size between enforcement encounter and payment 
compliance.  These results are also in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results.  The 
results would imply enforcement treatments had a small effect on payment compliance 
rate the fifth round.  However, since the results were not statistically significant at the 
0.05 alpha scientific community protection levels, we can only generalize these effect 
sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8.  In this case, the calculated 
post-hoc statistical power was 0.38.  Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the 
population. 
Table 31: Hypothesis 2b Round 5 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.115 - 
Phi 0.115 0.437 
Cramer’s V 0.115 0.437 
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IX.3.3.3 Round 6 Test Results 
 
 
Figure 18 shows the distribution of subjects’ propensity to comply given the 
number of enforcement treatments (1 thru 4 treatments).  As the picture shows, a larger 
number of participants subscribed to the safe harbor provision.  The figure also shows 
similar distributions for both groups (subscribed and not subscribed). Unlike the previous 
round, the figure shows a similar payment compliance given the number of enforcement 
treatments.  The statistical tests for significance are shown below. 
 
Figure 18: Round 6 Distributions between Enforcement Treatments and Payment 
Compliance Rate. 
   
To determine the relationship enforcement treatments and payment compliance in 
the sixth round, the Pearson’s χ2 was run.  Again, the Fisher Exact test was not run. 
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Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are 
independent in the fifth round. 
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and enforcement treatments are not 
independent in the fifth round. 
The results are provided on Table 32.  The Pearson’s χ2 the p-value was 0.863, 
which shows that we can accept the null hypothesis confirming that there is no 
association between enforcement treatments and employment tax payment compliance.  
This confirms that that enforcement treatments and payment compliance are not related at 
the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  The results confirm that a 
higher the number of enforcement treatments may not lead to higher payment compliance 
in the sixth round. 
Table 32: Hypothesis 2b Round 6 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df 
Asymp. p-value 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 0.742 a 3 0.863 
Likelihood Ratio 0.743 3 0.863 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.559 1 0.455 
a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is 1.89 
Table 33 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  The results 
found an η of 0.060 and an η2 of 0.003.  Using Cohen’s interpretation guidelines (Ruscio, 
2008), the results show a small effect size between payment compliance and enforcement 
treatments.  These results are also in line with the Phi and Cramer’s V test results.  The 
results would imply enforcement treatments had a small effect on payment compliance 
rate the sixth round.  However, since the results were not statistically significant at the 
0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can only generalize these effect 
sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8.  In this case, the calculated 
 117 
post-hoc statistical power was 0.11.  Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the 
population. 
Table 33: Hypothesis 2b Round 6 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.060 - 
Phi 0.060 0.863 
Cramer’s V 0.060 0.863 
 
IX.3.3.4 Hypothesis 2b ANOVA Test Results 
An ANOVA test was run for this hypothesis.  The ANOVA test evaluates the 
mean difference between employment tax payment compliance and the number of 
enforcement treatments.  As shown  
Table 34, the p-values were greater than the community-standard 5 percent alpha 
protection level.  Therefore, results confirm no dependency between the number of 
enforcement treatments and employment tax payment compliance. 
Table 34: ANOVA tests for Hypothesis 2b 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Round 4  1.653 3 0.551 2.340 0.075 
Round 5 0.647 3 0.216 0.901 0.442 
Round 6 0.185 3 0.062 0.243 0.866 
 
IX.3.4 Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 sets out to determine whether business owners who chose a safe 
harbor provision will be more compliant, with respect to payment compliance.  This 
section is segmented into three areas of results each one is focused on each round of 
testing. 
The tests in this subsection will identify if there is any statistical differences in the 
employment tax payment compliance and the number of enforcement treatments.  The 
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dependent variable for Hypothesis 3 is employment tax payment compliance, and the 
independent variable is subscription to the safe harbor provision.   
                 (6) 
Where PMT is the employment tax payment compliance  
SR is the subscription to the safe harbor provision 
Formula 6 states that the employment tax payment compliance should be higher 
for those subjects who subscribe to the safe harbor provision than for subjects who do 
not. 
Table 35 shows a sizable increase (about 10 percent) in the payment compliance 
rate once a safe harbor provision becomes an available choice.  It also shows an 
improvement of approximately four percent in compliance as subjects undergo 
enforcement treatments (i.e. round 3).  In the last round, we see a decrease in compliance 
when the income shock takes place. 
Table 35: Compliance and Noncompliance Rate by Rounds 
 Compliant  Non-Compliant 
Round 1 49.3% 50.7% 
Round 2 48.8% 51.2% 
Round 3 51.2% 48.8% 
Round 4 60.5% 39.5% 
Round 5 61.0% 39.0% 
Round 6 
52.7% 47.3% 
 
Table is similar to Table 45 
IX.3.4.1 Round 4 Testing 
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Figure 19 shows the distribution of payment compliance given the subscription to 
a safe harbor.  As the picture shows, a larger number of subjects subscribed to the safe 
harbor provision.  However, the figure shows slightly greater payment compliance for 
those subscribed to the safe harbor provision than for those who did not subscribe to the 
provision.  The statistical tests for significance are shown below. 
 
Figure 19: Round 4 Distributions between Payment Compliance and the Safe 
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate. 
 
To determine the relationship payment compliance and subscription to a safe 
harbor provision in the fourth round, Fisher Exact test and Pearson’s χ2 were used.  The 
results are show on. 
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe 
harbor provision are independent in the fourth round.  
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Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe 
harbor provision are not independent in the fourth round. 
The Fisher Exact test was not statistically significant (p-value of 0.124), so the 
null hypothesis is not rejected.  The results confirm that there is no association between 
employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe harbor provision.  
This conclusion is further collaborated by the Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.154), which 
shows that we can accept the null hypothesis and conclude that compliance and 
subscription to the safe harbor provision are not related at the community-standard 5 
percent alpha protection level.  The results confirm that subscribing to safe harbor may 
not lead to higher employment tax payment compliance in the fourth round. 
 
Table 36: Hypothesis 3 Round 4 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df 
Asymp. p-
value (2-
sided) 
Exact p-
value (2-
sided) 
Exact p-
value (1-
sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 2.034a 1 0.154   
Continuity Correction 
b
 1.346 1 0.246   
Likelihood Ratio 1.982 1 0.159   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.186 0.124 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
2.024 1 0.155   
 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is 6.32. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
Furthermore, Table 37 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  
The results found an η of 0.100 and an η2 of 0.01.  Using Cohen’s interpretation 
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a small effect size between compliance and 
subscription to the safe harbor provision.  These results are also in line with the Phi and 
Cramer’s V test results.  The results would imply the safe harbor subscription had a small 
effect on payment compliance rate the fourth round.  However, since the results were not 
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statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can 
only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8.  In 
this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.30.  Therefore, we cannot 
generalize these results to the population. 
Table 37: Hypothesis 3 Round 4 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.100 - 
Phi 0.100 0.154 
Cramer’s V 0.100 0.154 
 
IX.3.4.2 Round 5 
Figure 20 shows the distribution of subjects’ payment compliance given their 
subscription to the safe harbor provision.  As the picture shows, a larger number of 
subjects subscribed to the safe harbor provision, and the figure shows slightly greater 
payment compliance for those subscribed to the safe harbor provision than those who did 
not subscribe to the provision (as in round 4).  The statistical tests for significance are 
shown below. 
Figure 20: Round 5 Distributions between Payment Compliance and the Safe 
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate. 
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Fisher Exact Test and Pearson’s χ2 tests were used to determine the relationship 
payment compliance and subscription to a safe harbor provision in the fifth round, and 
results are show on Table 38.   
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe 
harbor provision are independent in the fifth round.  
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe 
harbor provision are not independent in the fifth round. 
The Fisher Exact test p-value was 0.166, so the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
The results confirm that there is no association between employment tax payment 
compliance and the subscription to the safe harbor provision.  This conclusion is further 
collaborated by the Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.219), which shows that we accept the null 
hypothesis and conclude that employment tax payment compliance and subscription to 
the safe harbor provision are not related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha 
protection level.  The results confirm that subscribing to safe harbor may not lead to 
higher employment tax payment compliance in the fifth round. 
Table 38: Hypothesis 3 Round 5 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df 
Asymp. p-value 
(2-sided) 
Exact p-
value (2-
sided) 
Exact p-
value (1-
sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 1.509 a 1 0.154   
Continuity Correction 
b
 0.938 1 0.333   
Likelihood Ratio 1.470 1 0.225   
Fisher's Exact Test    0.299 0.166 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
1.501 1 0.220   
 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is 6.63. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
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Furthermore, Table 39 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  
The results found an η of 0.086 and an η2 of 0.007.  Using Cohen’s interpretation 
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a small effect size between compliance and 
subscription to the safe harbor provision.  These results are also in line with the Phi and 
Cramer’s V test results.  The results would imply a safe harbor subscription had a small 
effect on payment compliance rate the fifth round.  However, since the results were not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can 
only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8.  In 
this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.22.  Therefore, we cannot 
generalize these results to the population. 
Table 39: Hypothesis 3 Round 5 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.086 - 
Phi 0.086 0.219 
Cramer’s V 0.086 0.219 
 
IX.3.4.3 Round 6 
Figure 21 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to a safe harbor 
and their payment compliance.  As the picture shows, a larger number of subjects 
subscribed to the safe harbor provision.  However, the figure does not shows much 
difference in payment compliance for those subscribed to the safe harbor provision than 
those subjects who did not subscribed to the safe harbor provision.  This is a departure 
from rounds 4 and 5.  The statistical tests for significance are shown below. 
 
 124 
Figure 21: Round 6 Distributions between Compliance Payment and the Safe 
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate. 
 
On Table 40 the results for this round are provided and it tests the relationship 
between payment compliance and subscription to a safe harbor provision in the sixth 
round.   
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe 
harbor provision are independent in the sixth round.  
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe 
harbor provision are not independent in the sixth round. 
The Fisher Exact test p-value was 0.516 accepting the null hypothesis.  Therefore, 
there is no association between employment tax payment compliance and subscription to 
the safe harbor provision in the sixth round.  This conclusion is further collaborated by 
the Pearson’s χ2 (p-value of 0.883), which shows that we accept the null hypothesis and 
conclude that compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision are not related at 
the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  The results confirm that 
subscription to the safe harbor provision may not lead to higher employment tax payment 
compliance in the sixth round. 
Table 40: Hypothesis 3 Round 6 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df Asymp. p- Exact p- Exact p-
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value (2-
sided) 
value (2-
sided) 
value (1-
sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 0.022 
a
 1 0.883   
Continuity Correction 
b
 0.000 1 1.000   
Likelihood Ratio 0.022 1 0.883   
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 0.516 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.021 1 0.884   
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is15.61. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Furthermore, Table 41 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  
The results found an η of 0.010 and an η2 of 0.000.  Using Cohen’s interpretation 
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a small effect size between compliance and 
subscription to the safe harbor provision.  These results are also in line with the Phi and 
Cramer’s V test results.  The results would imply the safe harbor subscription had a small 
effect on payment compliance rate the sixth round.  However, since the results were not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can 
only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8.  In 
this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 0.04.  Therefore, we cannot 
generalize these results to the population. 
Table 41: Hypothesis 3 Round 5 Effect Size Tests 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.010 - 
Phi 0.010 0.883 
Cramer’s V 0.010 0.883 
 
IX.3.4.4 Hypothesis 3 ANOVA test 
An ANOVA test was run for this hypothesis.  The ANOVA test evaluates the 
mean difference between employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to 
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the safe harbor provision.  As shown on Table 42, all the p-values were greater than the 
community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.   This confirms that there was no 
dependency between payment compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision 
(i.e., subscribed and not subscribed).  These results found not difference in the 
employment tax payment compliance for those who subscribe or did not subscribe.  
These results may be attributed to two events: 1) most of the subjects subscribed to the 
safe harbor and 2) overall employment tax payment compliance improved once 
subscription became available.
42
 
Table 42: Hypothesis 3ANOVA Tests 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Round 4  0.486 1 0.486 2.035 0.155 
Round 5 0.359 1 0.359 1.505 0.221 
Round 6 0.005 1 0.005 0.021 0.884 
 
IX.3.5 Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 sets out to determine whether a business owner who chose a safe 
harbor provision will remain more compliant after an income shock
43
 is experienced.  In 
this section, we built up on the results obtained in the Section 9.3.4: Hypothesis 3.  
However, in this section, a ratio variable was used as the dependent variable and binary 
variable remained as the independent variable. 
The tests in this subsection will identify if there is any statistical differences in the 
employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to a safe harbor provision 
given an income shock.  The dependent variable for Hypothesis 4 was employment tax 
                                                 
42
 The safe harbor subscription rate is discussed in Section IX.3.1and in Section IX.3.4.  The improvement 
in employment tax payment compliance is discussed in Section IX.3.6 
43
 Income shock is define as a 50 percent drop in firm revenue 
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payment compliance and the independent variable is subscription to the safe harbor 
provision given the introduction of an income shock. 
                     (7) 
Where PMT is the employment tax payment compliance category 
SR is the subscription to the safe harbor provision 
  I is the income shock imposed on round 6 
Formula 7 states that the employment tax payment compliance should be higher 
for those subjects who subscribe to the safe harbor provision than for subjects who do not 
subscribe even during an income shock. 
Figure 22 shows the distribution of subjects’ decision to subscribe to a safe harbor 
and their payment compliance.  As the picture shows, a larger number of subjects 
subscribed to the safe harbor provision.  However, the figure does not shows much 
difference in payment compliance for those subscribed to the safe harbor provision and 
those subjects who did not subscribed to the safe harbor provision. 
 
Figure 22: Round 6 Distributions between Payment Compliance and the Safe 
Harbor Provision Subscription Rate. 
 
To determine the relationship between employment tax payment compliance and 
subscription to a safe harbor provision after the income shock is applied, a Pearson’s χ2 
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was run and the results are show on Table 43.  Because of the data classification, the 
Fisher Exact test was not run. 
Ho: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe 
harbor provision given the income shock are independent in the sixth round.  
Ha: The employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to the safe 
harbor provision given the income shock are not independent in the sixth round. 
The Pearson’s χ2 the p-value was 0.883, which shows that we must accept the null 
hypothesis confirming that there is no association between employment tax payment 
compliance and subscription to the safe harbor provision once the income shock is 
applied.  This confirms that enforcement treatments and payment compliance are not 
related at the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  The results confirm 
that subscribing to safe harbor during and income shock may not lead to higher payment 
compliance. 
Table 43: Hypothesis 4 Statistical Tests 
Test Value df 
Asymp. p-value 
(2-sided) 
Pearson’s χ2 68.543
a
 76 0.716 
Likelihood Ratio 69.431 76 0.690 
Linear-by-Linear Association 0.177 1 0.674 
a. 150 cells (97.4%) have expected count less than 5.  The minimum expected count is 0.16. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
 
Furthermore, Table 44 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  
The results found an η of 0.578 and an η2 of 0.334.  Using Cohen’s interpretation 
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a moderate effect size between compliance 
and subscription to the safe harbor provision.  These results are also in line with the Phi 
and Cramer’s V test results.  The results would imply the safe harbor subscription had a 
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moderate effect on payment compliance rate the sixth round.  However, since the results 
were not statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, 
we can only generalize these effect sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 
0.8.  In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 1.00.  Therefore, we can 
generalize these results to the population. 
Table 44: Hypothesis 4 Effect Size Test 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.578 - 
Phi 0.578 0.716 
Cramer’s V 0.578 0.716 
 
IX.3.5.1 Hypothesis 4 ANOVA test 
An ANOVA test was run for this hypothesis.  The ANOVA test evaluates the 
mean difference between employment tax payment compliance and the subscription to 
the safe harbor provision given an income shock.  As Table 45 show, all the p-values 
were greater than the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  This 
confirms that there was no dependency between payment compliance and subscription to 
the safe harbor provision. 
Table 45: Round 6 ANOVA Test 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Round 6 0.005 1 0.005 0.021 0.675 
 
The results in hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 are similar, but required additional 
testing. 
IX.3.6 Additional Payment Compliance Analysis  
The payment compliance rate for rounds one through six are provided on Table 
46.  The information for round one through three provides the propensity to underpay.  
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The payment compliance rate for rounds four through six provided a compliance 
propensity for subjects under the safe harbor provision.  In general, the compliance 
increased for those rounds under the safe harbor provision. 
Table 46: Payment Compliance frequency by Round 
 Compliance Non-compliance Compliance Rate 
Round 1 101 104 49.3 
Round 2 100 105 48.8 
Round 3 105 100 51.2 
Round 4 124 81 60.5 
Round 5 125 80 61.0 
Round 6 108 97 52.7 
 
Table similar to Table 34 
IX.3.6.1 Payment Compliance ANOVA 
An index was created to identify the compliance rate before and after the safe 
harbor subscription provision was permitted.  Using ANOVA test, we tested to see if the 
propensity to comply had changed under the safe harbor provision.  The results are 
provided on Table 47 and they found statistical significance at 5%.  This means that the 
p-value was less than the community-standard 5 percent alpha protection level.  This 
confirms that there was dependency between payment compliance and subscription to the 
safe harbor provision. 
Table 47: ANOVA Test between Compliance Rates under the Safe Harbor 
Provision 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value 
Between groups 11.738 3 3.913 38.962 0.000 
Within Groups 20.184 201 0.100   
Total 31.922 204    
 
Furthermore, Table 48 shows the results from an effect size analysis using η2.  
The results found an η of 0.606 and an η2 of 0.368.  Using Cohen’s interpretation 
guidelines (Ruscio, 2008), the results show a moderate effect size between compliance 
 131 
α + β1 (risk control) + β2 (speculative risk) + 
β3 (risk control × speculative risk) 
and subscription to the safe harbor provision.  These results are also in line with the Phi 
and Cramer’s V test results.  The results would imply the safe harbor provision had a 
moderate effect on payment compliance rate on the last three rounds.  Since the results 
were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific community protection level and 
the statistical power is 1.00, we can generalize these results to the population. 
Table 48: Compliance Rates under a Safe Harbor Provision Effect Size Test 
Test Value Approx. p-value 
η 0.606  
Phi 0.647 0.000 
Cramer’s V 0.373 0.000 
 
IX.3.6.2 Logistic Regression Control Compliance 
Using FA score obtained from both the Risk Components (see Table 10) a logistic 
regression was ran to demine if risk control or speculative risk had any impact on 
compliance or subscription rate.  This is possible because our constructs were valid and 
reliable.   The four tables below show the results.   
IX.3.6.2.1 Employment Tax Payment Compliance 
 
 
Table 49 shows the payment compliance results obtained by running a logistic 
regression model using the FA analysis scores as independent variables (risk control, 
speculative risk and the interaction of risk control and speculative risk).  Table 50 
Provides the Nagelkerke R
2
 and the final omnibus model p-value.  The model is  
   
                                     
                                       
 =  
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Table 49: Payment Compliance logistic Regression Results Given Risk control 
 Compliance 
 B S.E. Wald p-value Odd Ratio 
Round 1 -0.029 0.140 0.044 0.364 0.971 
Round 2 -0.049 0.140 0.122 0.727 0.952 
Round 3 0.049 0.140 0.122 0.727 1.050 
Round 4 0.426 0.143 8.884 0.003
a
 1.531 
Round 5 0.446 0.143 9.716 0.002
a
 1.562 
Round 6 0.107 0.140 0.590 0.443 1.113 
a. Model obtained statistically significant results for the constant (or y-intercept). 
 
Table 50: Goodness of fit analysis  
Test p-value Nagelkerke R
2
 
Round 1 0.746 0.000 
Round 2 0.875 0.000 
Round 3 0938 0.000 
Round 4 0.322 0.000 
Round 5 0.477 0.000 
Round 6 0.126 0.000 
 
As the results from  
 
Table 49 and Table 50 show, none of the dependent variables were statically 
significant.  Furthermore, the goodness of fit test showed that this model was not able to 
explain any variation (R2 of 0.000).  Therefore, risk controls (risk control or speculative 
risk) did not have any influence payment compliance.  On the other hand, the fourth and 
fifth rounds were statistically significant and the odds ratio shows some effect on 
payment compliance.  However, since the results were not statistically significant at the 
0.05 alpha scientific community protection level, we can only generalize these effect 
sizes to the population if the statistical power is above 0.8.  In this case, the calculated 
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α + β1 (Prior round compliance) + β2 (Tax liability threshold) 
+ β3 (Availability to a safe harbor provision) + β4 (Income 
shock) + β5 (enforcement treatments in the prior round) 
–586 + 2.294(Prior round compliance) –1.289(Tax liability 
threshold) + 0.460 (Availability to a safe harbor provision) – 
0.603(Income shock) + 0.412(enforcement treatments in prior 
round) 
post-hoc statistical power was 0.04.  Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the 
population. 
In addition to risk controls, further exploration was conducted to determine if in 
fact payment compliance had improved by the implementation of the safe harbor 
provision.  Other logistic regression models were run to explore this premise.   
 
Table 51 provides the results from the final logistic regression model: 
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Table 51: Payment Compliance logistic Regression Results  
 Payment Compliance 
 B S.E. Wald p-value Odd Ratio 
Prior round compliance 2.294 .166 191.727 0.000 9.919 
Tax liability threshold -1.289 .162 63.231 0.000 0.276 
Availability to a safe harbor provision .460 .177 6.732 0.009 1.584 
Income Shock -.603 .232 6.789 0.009 0.547 
Enforcement treatments in prior round .412 .200 4.249 0.039 1.510 
Constant -.586 .181 10.519 0.001 0.557 
 
Table 52: Goodness of fit analysis  
 Cox & Snell R
2
 Nagelkerke R
2
 
Pseudo R
2
  0.343 0.458 
 
As the results from the  
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α + β1 (risk control) + β2 (speculative risk) + β3 (risk control × 
speculative risk) 
Table 51 and Table 52 show, subjects who were compliant in prior round would 
continue to maintain their compliant behavior.  It also showed that payment compliance 
decreases when the subject was assigned to the high tax liability threshold.  This is in 
accordance with the literature.  The model also showed that when the safe harbor 
provision is available, subjects are more likely comply with their payment obligations.  
The model found that income shock and prior enforcement experience would reduce the 
payment compliance of participants.  Furthermore, the goodness of fit test showed that 
this model was able to explain between 34 and 46 percent of the variation.  The 
classification table did show a classification prediction accuracy of 79.2 percent. 
Since the results were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific 
community protection level, we can generalize these effect sizes to the population if the 
statistical power is above 0.8.  In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 
1.00.  Therefore, we can generalize these results to the population. 
IX.3.6.2.2 Subscription Rate 
Table 53 shows the subscription results obtained from the logistic regression 
model using FA analysis scores as independent variables (risk control, speculative risk 
and the interaction of risk control and speculative risk).  Table 54 Provides the 
Nagelkerke R
2
 and the final omnibus model p-value. 
   
                     
                       
 =  
 
Table 53: Payment Compliance logistic Regression Results Given Risk control 
  Compliance 
  B S.E. Wald p-value Odd Ratio 
Round 4 
Risk Control 
a -0.490 0.241 4.119 0.042 0.613 
Y-intercept 2.574 0.283 82.534 0.000 13.125 
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α + β1 (Prior round compliance) + β2 (prior round 
enforcement encounter × availability of safe harbor) 
+ β3 (Availability to a safe harbor provision × tax 
liability threshold) + β4 (prior round compliance × 
tax liability threshold) 
Round 5 
Risk Control -0.460 0.236 3.819 0.051 0.631 
Y-intercept 2.495 0.273 83.637 0.000 12.120 
Round 6 
Risk Control -0.266 0.184 74.637 0.147 0.766 
Y-intercept 1.651 0.190 75.470 0.000 5.212 
a. speculative risk and the interaction of risk control and speculative risk were not statistically significant. 
 
Table 54: Goodness of fit analysis  
Test p-value Nagelkerke R
2
 
Round 4 0.046 0.046 
Round 5 0.054 0.041 
Round 6 0.000 0.000 
 
As the results from Table 53 and Table 54 show, one of the dependent variables 
(risk control) was statically significant.  However, it was only significant at predicting 
subscriptions rate in round 4, but not in the other two rounds.  The goodness of fit test 
showed that this model was not able to explain much of the variation, with an explain 
variation of around 4 percent.  The classification table did show a classification 
prediction accuracy of 91.7 percent. 
Although some of the results were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha 
scientific community protection level, we can still generalize these effect sizes to the 
population if the statistical power is above 0.8.  In this case, the calculated post-hoc 
statistical power was 0.742.  Therefore, we cannot generalize these results to the 
population. 
As with payment compliance, further logistics regressions were conducted to 
determine which factors drove the subjects’ decision to subscribe to the safe harbor 
provision.  The final model was: 
 
   
                                        
                                         
 = 
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–1.695 + 1.970 (Prior round compliance) + 1.748 (prior round 
enforcement encounter × availability of safe harbor) + 3.512 
(Availability to a safe harbor provision × tax liability threshold) 
– 2.564 (prior round compliance × tax liability threshold) 
 
Table 55: Subscription to Safe Harbor Regression Results 
 Payment Compliance 
 B S.E. Wald 
p-
value 
Odd 
Ratio 
Prior round compliance 1.970 .190 107.428 0.000 9.919 
Interaction of prior round enforcement encounter 
and availability of a safe harbor 
1.748 .319 29.942 0.000 0.276 
Interaction of availability of a safe harbor and tax 
liability threshold 
3.512 .243 208.095 0.009 1.584 
Interaction of prior round compliance and tax 
liability threshold 
-
2.564 
.306 70.058 0.009 0.547 
Constant 
-
1.695 
.161 111.157 0.039 1.510 
 
Table 56: Goodness of fit analysis  
 Cox & Snell R
2
 Nagelkerke R
2
 
Pseudo R
2
  0.320 0.427 
 
 
Table 55 and  
Table 56 provide the results from the model.  The results found subjects who were 
compliant in prior rounds were almost 10 times more likely to subscribe to a safe harbor 
provision.  On the other, the results found that subjects who encounter enforcement in the 
prior round were less likely to subscribe to a safe harbor provision once the provision 
became available.  The model results also found that higher tax liability threshold 
subjects were more likely to subscribe to the safe harbor provision once it became 
available. Lastly, the model showed that subject who were compliant and had a high tax 
liability threshold were more likely to subscribe to the safe harbor provision.   
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The goodness of fit test showed that this model was able to explain between 32 
and 42 percent of the variation.  The classification table did show a classification 
prediction accuracy of 77.0 percent. 
Since the results were statistically significant at the 0.05 alpha scientific 
community protection level, we can generalize these effect sizes to the population if the 
statistical power is above 0.8.  In this case, the calculated post-hoc statistical power was 
1.00.  Therefore, we can generalize these results to the population. 
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X DISCUSSION 
X.1 Contribution to Theory 
The theoretical motivation of this study is to enhance our understanding of 
taxpayers’ antisocial behavior using General Deterrence Theory.  Deterrence is the 
impact that punishment has on those who have not committed a criminal act (Blumstein 
et al., 1978).  In terms of tax enforcement, deterrence is the impact tax audits and their 
accompanying punishments, such as interest, penalties, and imprisonment, have on those 
individuals who have failed to report and pay taxes their tax requirements.   
The SMORC states that there are two methods to increase individuals’ marginal 
cost: (1) higher probability of being apprehended and (2) increased magnitude of 
punishment (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Ariely, 2012; Upadhyay, 2013).  This study 
has shown similar results. It showed that increased probability of apprehension leads to 
increased compliance.  Most importantly, this study has shown that individuals were 
willing to subscribe in large numbers to a safe harbor provision that eliminate the 
probability of apprehension in order to reduce their burden and avoid punishment 
(audit/enforcement encounter and penalties related to audit results).  Furthermore, this 
study was able to show that individuals were willing to improve their compliance rate 
when enforcement was increased as the literature had prescribed in other circumstances 
(Alm et al., 1992; Bloomquist, 2009; Hasseldine et al., 2007; Kalplowitz, 1973; Lijiao et 
al., 2014).   
General Deterrence Theory provides an explanation as to how different levels of 
punishment influence antisocial behavior.   The general measurement of deterrence can 
be achieved by calculating the change in criminal rates at different levels of punishment 
(Blumstein et al., 1978).  In this study a 10 percent improvement in compliance was 
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achieved.  This provides some evidence that General Deterrence Theory in fact reduced 
the antisocial behavior associated with the employment tax payment compliance. 
X.2 Contribution to Practice 
The practical motivation was to improve the understanding of voluntary reporting 
and payment of employment tax in the hopes of influence related IRS processing.  The 
results from this study suggest that provisions such as a safe harbor can be a method of 
reducing filing costs and audit costs and ultimately taxpayer burden.  On the other hand, 
the results of this study were inconclusive in determining if such provisions can improve 
payment compliance.  Nevertheless, the outcome of this study can improve timing and 
accuracy of employment taxes and it may improve the accuracy of employment tax 
payment. 
X.2.1 Employment Tax Motivation 
The practical focus on employment tax was driven by the impact it has on the tax 
gap, which accounts for an approximately 72 billion dollars (IRS, 2012b) loss to the US 
government every year.  The practical focus for using a safe harbor was based on the IRS 
believes that improving voluntary compliance is necessary to reduce the tax gap (IRS, 
2009).  Given the complexity of the IRC and the IRS responsibility for ensuring that 
taxpayers understand and meet their tax obligations, including filing and payment of 
employment tax, this research results can assist the Service in improving their client’s tax 
obligations and reducing taxpayer burden.  This study set out to determine if a safe harbor 
provision could minimize the employment tax filing burden and improve employment tax 
payment compliance.  As the results show, a safe harbor provisions can be a method for 
reducing filing burden and potentially improve payment compliance. 
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As the data in Table 1 suggested, third party matching already exists and filing 
compliance is high.  However, that does not reduce enforcement activities or the time it 
takes to file the necessary Form 94X to comply with the payment of employment tax.  
The results of this study show that a safe harbor provision would reduce the filing burden 
and some enforcement activities related to employment tax filing.  Furthermore, this 
research shows potential opportunities in improving employment tax payment 
compliance.  The results show an increase of approximately 10 percent in payment 
compliance during a safe harbor periods that did not encounter an income shock.  This 
shows that while a safe harbor provision will not prevent a subscriber from not 
complying during difficult financial epochs, it does show that subjects are willing to 
comply under normal circumstances.  Therefore, this study has shown that tax authorities 
can reduce taxpayer burden and can use such provisions to reduce failure-to-pay 
employment tax. 
X.2.2 Compliance Motivation 
The practical focus on compliance is based on the premise that random audits lead 
to better predictions of noncompliance (Bloomquist, 2009).  However, the current IRS 
state of smaller corporate audit coverage, current compliance identification methods, and 
shrinking enforcement personnel budgets, there is a need to improve voluntary payment, 
filing, and reporting compliance for employment tax.  Furthermore, increasing deficits 
put pressure on the IRS to enhance compliance.   
Although this study would not improve the NRP model used for predicting 
compliance, future studies could improve how or when the IRS conducts physical audit.  
Since subscribers of a safe harbor provision are more likely to be compliant and a large 
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number of subjects were willing to subscribe to a safe harbor provision, the IRS could 
substantially reduce the number of Revenue Agents (RAs) it uses to conduct field audits.  
The importance of this narrower focus study is because physical audits are costly and IRS 
budgets are shrinking. 
Because of long running deficits, the IRS began identifying ways to reduce the tax 
gap (Brown & Mazur, 2003; Holland, 1958; IRS, 1996).  After the great recession of 
2008 the IRS instituted initiatives to curtail the $72 billion tax gap from employment tax 
(IRS, 2009).   This study is in line with the IRS’s initiative to revising the collection due 
process for employment taxes and studying employment tax reporting and filing 
compliance (IRS, 2009).   
This research study provides ways to simplify the filing and payment process 
associated with the employment tax and it shows a statistical improvement on the current 
process.  This study builds on the simplification of employment tax payment, which 
Bloomquist (2003b) states could lead to increased compliance. 
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XI LIMITATIONS   
The design used has great internal validity.  However, the external validity for this 
type of design is not sufficient to infer to the greater population.  One of the major 
reasons is the inability to determine the presence of non-response bias and the ability to 
randomly select subjects from the population.  Therefore, inference to the subjects who 
undertook this experiment is possible, but not to the population.  In future research, 
obtaining from the IRS a sample from the population of employers who actually pay 
employment tax to randomly select participants would be helpful in overcoming this 
limitation, and this could result in different conclusions.  
Another limitation of this design can be the lack of realism that the web-based 
experiment may exhibit, which may lead to behaviors not observed in the naturally 
occurring world.  Lastly, this study was a web-based experiment and there is a valid 
criticism as to its rigor.  A major criticism is the ability for subjects to drop out of the 
experiment because it is easier to end a web based experiment than walking out of a 
laboratory experiment (Wade & Tingling, 2005).  Another critic is that only those with 
web access are able to access the experiment.  Nevertheless, Wade and Tingling (2005) 
do suggest that web experiments can be effective with “internal validity, volunteer bias, 
demand characteristics, external validity, financial cost and time” (pg. 81).  To overcome 
this design limitation, a similar experiment could be augmented using lab and web 
subjects to compare and verify results.  A more robust study would include a pilot using a 
sample form the actual population, where results could be compared to the control group 
not selected in the pilot.  
During the completion of the experiment, subjects were instructed to identify how 
much employment tax withholding they needed to pay.  However, about 20 percent of all 
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participants paid only the employer’s (or employee) portion of the employment tax 
payment.  It is possible that even though the instructions stated they needed to pay both 
employer and employee’s portion, some subjects only paid the employer’s portion 
without noticing that they had to pay both.  Since there was not interaction between the 
student PI and the subjects, it is impossible to identify if this was done on purpose or if it 
was an oversight.  On the other hand, if individuals who encounter enforcement had been 
subject to some additional educational information, it is possible that the hypothesis 3 and 
4 results would have been quite different.  This limitation suggests future research design 
changes, naturally. 
Carryover effect (learning effect, or order effect) was another design limitation.  
Carryover affect occurs when experiment subject have undergone the same task or 
scenario a number of times, and subjects either become better through practice or become 
worse through fatigue.  Since the experiment did not randomly assign the income shock 
through different rounds of the experiment, the study results cannot separate if the results 
are due to the introduction of the treatment (income shock) or if subjects were simply 
learning how to respond to the experiment.  To resolve this limitation, future studies 
could use counterbalancing techniques.  Future studies could implement randomize order 
of the income shock treatment variables as used in Kalambokidis et al. (2012). 
Lastly, payment of participants is a limitation on the design.  Since the 
participants were all paid the same amount regardless of their selection, participants did 
not have an economic incentive to maximize their payoffs.  This limits the ability to 
identify whether or not subjects reacted to economic incentive.  Future studies could use 
true economic penalties for incorrectly paying or filing their taxes during the experiment 
 144 
by reducing economic payout (i.e., pay less to those who are found noncompliant).  
Furthermore, the experiment could implement a random payout selection.  This rule 
would randomly identify the results of a round to compensate the subjects (Kalambokidis 
et al., 2012).  The enhancements identified could be used to better mimic a real world 
environment and assess true taxpayer behavior. 
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APPENDICES 
XI.1 Appendix A: Test Questionnaire  
You have been asked to play the role of the typical small business owner with 
four fulltime employees.  Your business gross receipts are $350,000 dollars for this 
round.  Your industry operating expenses are estimated to be around 20% of gross 
receipts and other expenses (such as cost of goods sold) are approximately 40% of gross 
receipts. 
During this round, you should expect to operate as if it were a normal business 
environment.  This will include paying your accounts payable, overhead, and taxes for 
your business.  You will also be required to finalize a tax form, and should expect for all 
current laws to apply as you file and pay employment tax.  In addition, you should expect 
the normal application of the law and that legal system will work its way through as 
expected. 
Over the past several years, your business has experienced normal economic 
conditions and you have experienced average sales numbers, which you expect will grow 
at a normal rate in the future.  In addition, your firm has maintained strong cash flow and 
your accounts receivables and accounts payables are up to date. With respect to your 
employees, you have had no issues paying their salaries and have made all the quarterly 
employment tax withholding deposits.   
During this round, the Experiment Authorities will not conduct any audits.   
The following information will help in assessing your company’s financial 
situation for this questionnaire.  You must use the information provided to determine the 
employment tax obligation. 
1. Your company gross receipts were $350,000 this quarter. 
2. Your firm employs four (4) full time fulltime employees. 
a. Their average income was $15,250 for the quarter, a calculation 
which totals $61,000 or (4 x $15,250) in labor costs. 
b. Your employment tax per employee should be relatively easy to 
pay at $2,500 per employee.  This totals $10,000 per quarter for all 
employees. 
3. Your employees' federal withholding for employment tax is $10,000 (This 
is money withheld from employees’ income to be deposited to the 
Enforcement Authorities by the employer). 
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Simplified Balance Sheet 
Accounts Receivables Debits Credits 
Gross Receipts (Revenue)   $350,000 
Wages, tips, and other compensation $61,000   
Employment tax (Employer's Portion) $10,000   
Operating expenses (e.g., rent, utility, etc.) $70,000   
Other Expenses (e.g., COGS, inventory, etc.) $140,000   
Total Expenses   (-$281,000) 
Net Income   $61,000  
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XI.2 Appendix B: IRS Tax Form 944  
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XI.3 Appendix C:  Recruitment Script and Hand-out 
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XI.4 Appendix D: Additional literature review 
XI.4.1 Corporate responsibility 
The corporate responsibility literature has discussed such constructs as brand 
reputation and social responsibility as they are associated with the filing and payment of 
taxes.  At the center of the work on brand reputation is how firms manage their public 
perception as a social steward when designing tax strategies.  Currently companies are 
managing their tax strategies by assessing how aggressive the public perceives the 
company tax strategies (Donohoe et al., 2014; Harvey Jr, 2014).  If a firm is perceived as 
too aggressive by the public, the public perception may impact the company’s filing 
strategy (Hanlon & Slemrod, 2009).  Moreover, companies that demonstrate higher levels 
of corporate social responsibility were more likely to engage in lower levels of tax 
avoidance (Dowling, 2014; Lanis & Richardson, 2015) and, therefore, choose less 
aggressive tax strategies. 
The link being made in with this literature review is how subjective norms effect 
individual actions.  While individual filings are private and the exerted behavior is not a 
public, the subjective norm link could be considers tenuous.  However, corporate filings 
are not private and connection on reputation and subjective norms could be derived.  
Since corporate tax literature was used as a proxy for the segment studied (small 
business), it could be suggested that corporate responsibility can affect employment tax 
behaviors in small business in similar fashion – not identical fashion. 
XI.4.2 Employment Tax and Tax Incidence 
In economics, the term-of-art tax incidence is used as a framing for who 
ultimately is responsible for paying the tax.  The general perception is that the individual 
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consuming the product pays the taxes.   However, that is not always the case.  To 
illustrate this concept, let us discuss the consumption of labor.  Firms consume labor.  In 
times of economic decline, the number of employee vis-à-vis jobs is higher (i.e., an 
excess of labor).  In such time, employers do not have increase wage to acquire new 
labors, and thus any increase in employment tax will be passed to employees because 
employees will accept less favorable job in such economic circumstances.  In times of 
economic expansion, the number of employee vis-à-vis jobs is lower (i.e., a shortage of 
labor).  In such time, employers would have increase wage to acquire new labors, and 
thus any increase in employment tax will be borne by employer. 
In terms of labor markets, the party (either employer or employee) with the 
highest price elasticity of labor will pay a smaller portion of the tax.  The literature has 
shown that this tax is more commonly “borne by labour” (pg. 189) (Hamermesh, 1979; 
Holmlund, 1981; Vroman, 1974).  The literature has also shows that employment tax 
incidence has a bigger impact on the wage earning class than the investment class.  This 
impact due because the investment class’s effective income is lower than the wage 
earning class (Sugin, 2014) and because the payroll tax has increased in the US from 4.2 
percent to 6.2 percent in 2013 “as part of the fiscal cliff resolution” (pg. 94) (Bracha & 
Cooper, 2013).44  The increase of employment tax has an impact on effective wages, 
which may lead to increase noncompliance of self-employed taxpayers who may be 
trying to increase their real wages. 
Other studies have analyzed the impact of different taxes on income (e.g., income 
tax versus payroll tax).  Some studies have shown that payroll taxes are a greater 
                                                 
44
 The changes required the payroll tax to revert to the previous level on January 
1, 2013. 
 154 
proportion of the tax incidence for the majority of US households because the average 
household has a larger proportion of wage income than investment income (Heim et al., 
2014; Mitrusi & Poterba, 2001).  Studies concluded that payroll taxes are becoming a 
greater portion of the tax incidence because of the introduction of the EITC, which 
reduces taxable income.  On the other hand, there have been no significant changes in the 
employment tax law.  Moreover, Heim et al. (2014) explains that the positive payment of 
employment tax has decreased from 79 percent to 75 percent between 2001 and 2011. 
From these aforementioned studies, we can infer that employment tax is 
becoming a larger portion of the tax incidence for wage earners and that the tax incidence 
has decreased over the last decade.  Nevertheless, the authors do not articulate a causal 
reason as to why these changes are taking place.  They do attribute some of these changes 
to the great recession and changes in the code,45 but these attributions are not based on 
research. 
To be able to assess the employment tax incident, we also must understand how 
employment tax affects the supply of labor.  Some research studies have discusses how 
decreases in payroll taxes increase labor participation due to a reduction in employment 
tax (Creedy, 2010; Engelhardt & Kumar, 2014; Kugler & Kugler, 2009).  In other words, 
a decrease in payroll tax will increase labor supply because of an increase in real wages 
and a reduction in labor cost (Goerke, 2002; Månsson & Quoreshi, 2015; Saez et al., 
2012b).   This suggested increase in labor supply the tax incident on employees, which 
would have little impact on employment tax compliance.  On the other hand, a reduction 
                                                 
45
 The change in the Code refers to the decrease in the payroll tax from 6.2 to 4.2 
in 2010 to 2013. 
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on the supply of labor could affect employment tax compliance because employers have 
to make the payments. 
What is the challenge to understanding the impact of employment tax 
compliance?  MacRae and MacRae (1976) show that the supply of labor would not 
change with an increase in the payroll tax because there would be and offset between 
elastic and inelastic workers.  Moffitt (1977) clarifies that the offsets occur when the 
budget constraint is linear, but a non-linear budget constraint would lead to a reduction in 
labor supply46 anytime a payroll tax increase.   In general, the literature shows that there 
is an inverse relation between labor supply and tax changes, but with more complex 
models with additional dimensions of taxpayer behavior, the relationship between labor 
supply and tax changes is ambiguous or negligible (Bauer & Riphahn, 2002; Collins & 
Plumlee, 1991; Cruces, Galiani, & Kidyba, 2010; Moffitt, 1977).  Because of mixed 
results in the empirical studies, there is no clear way to identify how employment tax 
incident influences its compliance. 
Beyond the tax incidence and its impact on labor and wages, a paper defined 
payroll tax dilemma.  The payroll tax dilemma is when a firm cannot meet its operational 
liabilities and it uses employment tax withholdings to pay for these liabilities (Godfrey, 
2004; Mauldin & Wilder, 1997).  Companies normally face a liquidity crisis during 
economic downturns or economic distress, such as the great recession (Grady, 2013).  
Grady (2013) indicates that many of these businesses continue to illegally borrow from 
withheld taxes for expanded periods of time, and found that the majority of those 
businesses will eventually fail.  Bloomquist (2003a) also argues that a financial strain is 
                                                 
46
 Most studies focus on the labor supply (instead of labor demand) because 
employees had borne the cost of an increase in employment tax. 
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one of the determinants of noncompliance for all taxpayers.  One of the arguments of this 
study is that some of the authorized individual will succumb to the payroll tax dilemma 
when confronting a liquidity crisis (or strain).  The argument is that individuals decide to 
use employment tax withholding as a short-term loan without clearly understanding the 
negative implications. 
XI.4.3 Characteristics of non-filers 
Much of the compliance literature focuses on non-filers because they introduce 
biases on the outcome of all predictions.  The consequence of non-filers is that the 
absence of their data makes all noncompliance appear less fraudulent.  Therefore, 
understanding non-filers is essential to minimize noncompliance (Feinstein, 1991).  The 
inability to adjust the data (e.g., using weights) for non-filers increases the tax gap, 
reduces our understanding of tax compliance behavior, and impedes proper compliance 
enforcement.  
Erard and Ho (2001) identified non-filers as “ghosts” (pg.26) because very little is 
known about this segment of the tax base.  More explicitly, they labeled these taxpayers 
as ghosts because they do not comply with any filing requirements and it is very difficult 
for authorities or academic to identify or locate them.  The non-filers in Erard and Ho’s 
(2001) study were located by the IRS through “intensive search by IRS agents” (pg. 30).  
They explain that if an individual is hard to find it would increase the taxpayer’s 
willingness not to file.   
Erard and Ho’s (2001) also found that variables such as prior filing, marital status, 
and age could be used to identify known filer.  For instance, older taxpayers are less 
likely to be noncompliance.  The general consensus is that they are more risk adverse.  
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On the other hand, married couples are more likely to be noncompliant because their 
taxes are more complex and lead to more evasion.  This view is consistent with Andreoni 
et al. (1998), Clotfelter (1983), and Feinstein (1991) studies.  These studies found that the 
complexity of tax filing has an impact on taxpayers.  For example, Erard and Ho’s (2001) 
found that taxpayers who are at the margin of the filing requirement may be deterred 
from complying because of the cost associated with filing taxes.  They also found that 
non-filers are more likely to be recipients of blue-collar business income, and are more 
likely to have their source of income from business or capital gains.  Again, suggesting 
that lack of detection increases noncompliance.   
The most interesting characteristic of ghosts is that income and taxable income 
are substantially smaller than other filers, and ghosts use less adjustment than other filers 
(Erard & Ho, 2001).  This is interesting because one of their suggestions associated with 
this behavior was that the non-filer would appear as an accidently noncompliant taxpayer, 
instead of deliberate act of evasion.  This act of evasion draws attention to the issues of 
normative beliefs and subjective norms (Bloomquist, 2003b; Fischer et al., 1992).  
Normative beliefs are defined as the established behaviors, and it is assumed that all 
individuals will behave according to expectations (Ajzen, 1991; CSLI, 2011).  Subjective 
norm is the peer pressure to behave in a certain way (Chatzisarantis & Biddle, 1998).  
The collective of normative beliefs of an individual is the foundation of his\her subjective 
norms (Ajzen, 1991).  Therefore, it could be derived that these ghosts believe the act of 
non-compliance is acceptable at the individual and group level. 
As with tax literature, compliance literature has also has shown that individuals’ 
compliance will be affected similar belief and norms, and provides three plausible causes: 
 158 
 Embracement of apprehension 
 Satisfaction with the government or fiscal equity 
 Fairness of the tax system 
Gordon (1989) study examined the concept of morality as deterrence of tax 
evasion.  Morality is affected by to forces: internal and external.  The internal force could 
be described and an individual’s ethics.  He proposes that individuals with high ethical 
standards will continue to properly and voluntaries comply even when the cost of evading 
are substantially lower than the gains.  The external forces can simply be explained as 
peer influence.  He specifies reputation cost of being apprehended.  There are two 
alternative outcomes.  If there are many people being apprehended, noncompliance 
becomes a batch of honor and it may increase.  On the other hand, if within a group, the 
evader is alone.  He/she may feel a sense of shame because of the reputational cost, 
leading to improved compliance.   
In his study, Gordon (1989) also found that “small evaders” (pg. 804) were more 
likely to become noncompliant as tax rate increased.  Small evaders were defined as 
taxpayers who were already underreporting their taxes.  Whereby, “non-evaders” (pg. 
800) were less likely to change their filing behavior because the decision was not a 
monetary decision, but ethical.  The ethical decision was based on personal cost of 
breaking the law, and the reputational cost associated with being apprehended. 
As mentioned above, there appears to be a relationship between perceptions of 
fiscal equity tax compliance.  Fiscal equity could be defined as perception on treatment of 
taxpayer, the level of taxpayer burden, and complexity of the code (Bloomquist, 2003a).  
An example of inequity could be a progressive tax, such as the income tax, where 
 159 
taxpayers in the upper income brackets are required to pay more as a proportion of their 
income.  Conversely, a regressive tax, such as sales tax, could be consider inequitable for 
taxpayers in the lower income brackets because they would be required to pay more taxes 
as a proportion of their income. 
Another source of inequity was identified by Piketty and Saez (2003).  In their 
paper, they provide IRS time series data on income, and it showed that income inequality 
over the last few decades has increased.  Bloomquist (2003a) explain how income 
inequality influences overall reporting compliance, basing most of her argument on the 
concealment sources of income.  On the other hand, she emphasizes how the lack of 
taxpayers’ financial stability due to income inequality leads to noncompliance.  She 
argues that because individuals’ future expected cost of detection is lower than the 
present need for money.  In other words, individuals’ calculations of potential outcomes 
are biased due to temporal distance and individuals many times believe that the rosy 
outcome will prevail (Pennington & Roese, 2003).47  This is due to people’s inability to 
accurately and consistently predict future outcomes (Kahneman, 2011).  Therefore, 
taxpayers expected utility maximization formulation is incorrect and it results in 
noncompliance.   
Spicer and Becker (1980) also provide empirical evidence that the relationship 
does exist between equity and compliance.  Their theoretical argument is based on 
expected utility theory and “inequity theory” (pg. 174), and it stresses that individuals 
will use tax evasion as a vehicle to adjust inequities.  They propose that if tax equity is 
perceived favorable to the taxpayer, he/she will reduce his/her noncompliance level.  For 
                                                 
47
 This optimistic outlook could also be due to insensitivity to predictability 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) 
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example, Bloomquist (2003a) provides evidence of this phenomenon using data 
following the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  In her findings, lower effective taxes on the 
wealthiest American lead to better compliance.  On the other hand, if tax equity hinders 
taxpayer, he/she will increase the tax evasion level.   
Spicer and Becker (1980) results showed that “victims” (pg. 171) of inequity 
would increase their noncompliance behavior.  This finding is also collaborated by Alm 
et al. (1992), which explained that to increase compliance the government should make 
individuals aware of how their taxes are benefiting those who pay.  Examples of this 
could be Washington State DOT, Miami-Dade County (FL) transportation, and Forsyth 
County (GA).  All of these governmental bodies provide some source of communiqué 
near public work sites to show taxpayers’ how their taxes are being used. 
They too study the relationship between equity and compliance, and found a 
causal effect between the two.  Studies claim that level of satisfaction with government 
services and will have an impact on compliance level (Alm, 1991; Alm et al., 1992). 
Lastly, fairness is based on the individuals’ perception of how many people are getting 
away with evading taxes (Andreoni et al., 1998; Erard, 1997; Erard & Ho, 2001).  If 
individuals perceive that a large number of people are evading taxes, they too are likely 
to underreport.   
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